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Abstract		This	paper	examines	the	developments	that	lead	up	to	the	government	bailout	of	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	in	2009.		The	purpose	is	to	examine	and	discover	the	historical,	industrial	and	financial	factors	that	drove	American	cars	into	the	ground.		In	today’s	society,	the	perception	is	that	foreign	automobiles	are	superior	to	domestic	vehicles.		This	comes	half	a	century	after	culture	in	the	United	States	circulated	around	the	American	automobile.		The	American	big	business	techniques	built	a	manufacturing	empire,	differentiated	the	US	from	the	foreigners	and	then	weakened	the	long-term	development	of	the	automotive	industry.		Financialization	became	a	support	in	an	attempt	to	support	a	crumbling	system.		Each	individual	strategy	was	successful	in	the	short	term	but	came	together	to	negatively	influence	the	long-term	industry.		These	elements	conclude	a	self-destructive	fate	of	the	US	automobile	manufacturers.		The	bailout	was	not	the	fault	of	the	nation	but	rather	the	responsibility	of	the	Big	Three.			 	
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Introduction		 	During	the	mid	twentieth	century,	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	were	booming	with	growing	business	and	a	customer	base	that	craved	American	automobiles.		Today,	the	automotive	industry	is	still	one	of	the	largest	and	most	powerful	sectors	in	the	United	States.	However,	since	the	time	of	auto	boom,	the	American	automakers	have	been	downsizing	in	relation	to	the	whole	industry	and	losing	interest	from	the	population.		Foreign	manufacturers	have	been	increasingly	taking	market	share	away	from	the	US	brands	to	the	extent	that	the	Americans	are	fighting	to	survive.		In	2007	the	Big	Three	US	carmakers	approached	the	United	States	government	pleading	for	a	stimulus	package	that	would	save	them	from	bankruptcy.		How,	then,	did	a	dominant	American	industry	fall	from	glory	into	shambles	over	half	a	century?		 The	decline	of	the	US	automotive	industry	began	before	any	of	the	three	companies	showed	any	signs	of	decay.		The	problem	was	not	with	the	carmakers	specifically,	but	with	big	business	in	America	as	a	whole.		Large-scale	production	is	a	characteristic	of	US	manufacturing	since	the	beginning.		Definitive	characteristics	come	along	with	large	scale	manufacturing	that	separate	it	from	foreign	industries.		While	it	is	perceived	that	big	business	is	synonymous	with	success,	we	will	examine	below	why	it	can	be	self-destructive	to	an	industry.		The	US	automakers	did	not	understand	that	there	exists	too	much	of	one	thing	and	it	requires	further	exploration	in	order	to	expand.		The	American	automakers	believed	that	a	single	working	strategy	could	be	expanded	continuously.		This	defined	the	policy	of	American	auto	growth.		The	Big	Three	began	using	this	to	manufacture	vehicles	and	later	translated	the	same	strategy	into	their	financialization.		
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	 The	perception	is	that	the	decline	of	the	US	automakers	is	due	to	the	state	of	the	economy	during	the	2007	financial	crisis.		However	I	believe	a	government	bailout	package	would	have	been	necessary	even	if	the	economy	had	not	went	into	a	recession.		Statistics	are	evidence	that	a	decline	had	begun	far	before	the	national	economic	decay.		The	practices	of	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	display	deteriorating	stability	and	a	lack	of	long	term	growth	that	originated	from	old	habits.		The	Big	Three	had	built	an	empire	upon	a	deteriorating	foundation	that	was	bound	to	crumble.		As	the	companies	financialized	further	between	1990	and	2007,	the	weaknesses	in	the	industrial	groundwork	were	magnified.		A	weak	manufacturing	industry	held	up	by	risky	financial	practices	concludes	in	failure.		The	financial	crisis	of	2007	was	the	stimulus	that	caused	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	to	finally	crumble	but	was	not	the	driving	force	that	brought	the	firms	to	that	point.	
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1.		Automotive	Industrialization	
	
European	Manufacturing		 During	the	2007	economic	recession,	American	banks	and	businesses,	including	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler,	were	drowning	in	a	financial	catastrophe.		As	thousands	of	American	workers	were	losing	jobs,	Germany	was	enduring	positive	development.		German	employment	rose	through	the	late	2000s,	an	overall	period	of	poor	economic	state.		The	United	States	was	suffering	from	unprecedented	unemployment	rates	during	the	same	period.		The	reasons	for	this	deviation	are	rooted	in	the	background	and	development	of	each	economy,	as	well	as	the	manufacturing	industry	with	each.	A	powerful	economy	relies	on	an	equally	powerful	manufacturing	sector	in	order	to	create	goods.		The	more	products	a	nation	is	able	to	produce	and	successfully	sell,	the	more	stimulation	will	be	generated	within	the	economy.		In	order	to	effectively	produce	a	large	number	of	goods,	a	country	must	have	a	very	large	customer	base	and	therefore	export	to	foreign	countries.		This	opens	up	a	much	wider	population	of	possible	customers	than	the	limited	number	within	each	nation.		To	do	so	means	the	manufacturing	industries	must	be	capable	of	producing	items	that	are	consumed	within	as	well	as	outside	the	country.		As	the	
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United	States	hit	the	economic	recession	in	the	late	2000s	president	Barack	Obama	understood	raising	exports	would	help	boost	the	economy.		However,	by	2011	the	US	was	far	behind	in	their	export	industries	and	“Germany	had	quietly	become	the	world’s	second-largest	exporter	(after	China)”	(Rattner	7).			How,	therefore,	did	the	much	smaller	European	nation	grow	to	surpass	the	economic	giant	in	such	an	important	financial	facet?	Germany’s	success	is	based	around	their	private	as	well	as	their	public	sectors.		The	foundation	to	Germany’s	manufacturing	and	success	is	the	Mittelstand.		The	Mittelstand	is	the	vast	number	of	small	to	medium	sized	private	firms	that	make	up	the	majority	of	the	German	manufacturing	industry.		These	smaller	companies	focus	on	“producing	sophisticated	goods	that	emerging	markets	cannot	easily	replicate”	(Rattner	8).		What	this	means	is	that	each	small	firm	concentrates	all	of	its	resources	on	developing	only	a	few	goods.		In	doing	so,	all	of	these	parts	are	given	great	attention	and	a	large	importance	is	placed	upon	each	one.		In	addition,	these	companies	aim	toward	long-term	growth	instead	of	short-term	profits.	This	is	a	disaggregated	system	of	manufacturing.		Each	good	coming	out	of	individual	upstream	firms	is	moved	to	downstream	companies	to	create	the	final	good	for	consumers.		According	to	Rattner,	the	German	saying	is	“we	make	the	thing	that	goes	inside	the	thing	that	goes	inside	the	thing”	(8).		This	allows	each	individual	product	and	part	to	be	more	superior	as	it	gets	more	attention.		This	should	not	be	confused	with	horizontal	integration	in	which	multiple	small	firms	manufacturing	the	same	or	similar	products	merge	to	form	a	larger	firm.		Instead,	the	German	system	utilizes	many	small,	separated	firms	manufacturing	different	goods	that	combine	downstream	to	form	a	final	good.		The	contrary	strategy	is	for	a	single	company	to	manufacture	most	or	all	parts	that	are	
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necessary	in	producing	the	final	product.		This	is	known	as	vertical	integration,	which	is	characteristic	of	the	United	States	automotive	manufacturers.		The	American	system	of	big	business	manufactures	many	different	parts	that	go	into	the	final	product	by	one	company	within	the	same	factory.	On	top	of	private	sector	success,	Germany’s	public	sector	aims	to	help	the	economy.		One	such	example	is	the	Agenda	2010.		Passed	in	2005	by	the	then	chancellor,	this	reorganized	the	German	welfare	system.		The	policy	aimed	at	“pairing	unemployment	benefits	to	encourage	work,	relaxing	stultifying	regulatory	practices,	and	forging	a	grand	bargain	with	labor	unions	whereby	the	unions	agreed	to	hold	down	wages	and	the	government	assured	job	security	for	workers”	(Rattner	8).		According	to	the	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	this	agenda	saved	about	half	a	million	jobs	by	2009.		Policies	such	as	this	aid	in	assisting	individuals	and	businesses	as	well	as	boosting	economic	growth.	Besides	the	Mittelstand	and	government	policy,	Germany’s	economy	is	largely	based	around	its	automotive	superpowers.		BMW,	Daimler	and	Volkswagen	reside	in	and	make	up	nearly	20	percent	of	Germany’s	GDP,	according	to	Rattner.		These	three	firms	are	the	parent	companies	to	Mini,	Rolls	Royce,	Mercedes-Benz,	Smart,	Maybach,	AMG,	Audi,	Bentley,	Lamborghini,	Bugatti	and	Porsche.		While	the	three	large	companies	contain	many	subsidiaries,	all	of	the	brands	are	making	expensive	vehicles.		The	high	sales	figures	from	the	large	German	automakers	contribute	to	a	high	level	of	product	innovation.		The	Germans	are	known	for	over	engineering	their	products	and	striving	for	perfection.		Figure	1.1	below	demonstrates	the	level	of	investment	put	into	the	continued	manufacturing	of	German	cars	and	trucks.		The	figure	displays	relative	levels	of	research	and	development	in	
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German	industries.		In	2014	alone,	over	17.6	billion	euros	were	spent	on	German	automobile	research	and	development	(Industry	Overview:	The	Automotive	Industry	in	Germany,	Germany	Trade	&	Invest).		This	exemplifies	the	innovation	within	BMW,	Daimler	and	Volkswagen.			
Figure	1.1:		Research	and	development	expenditure	in	Germany	2015.		Graph	from	Germany	Trade	&	Invest		Germany’s	automotive	industry	has	exceeded	in	producing	high-end	cars.		The	benefit	of	producing	these	types	of	vehicles	is	they	flourish	in	affluent,	booming	markets	like	China.		China	“alone	accounts	for	25	percent	of	BMW’s	global	profits”	(Rattner	8).		The	story	is	the	same	with	the	other	German	auto	manufacturers	who	also	have	high	sales	levels	in	foreign	countries.		This	means	that	the	German	manufacturing	industry,	along	with	the	entire	economy,	is	largely	based	on	exports.	As	shown	above,	this	is	largely	beneficial	to	a	nation’s	economy.		While	the	United	States	was	attempting	to	raise	their	export	numbers,	
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Germany	had	already	dominated	the	sector	by	creating	a	product	foreign	countries	want.		This	has	proven	to	be	a	very	successful	strategy	demonstrated	by	the	current	strength	of	the	German	economy.			
	
Japanese	Development	After	World	War	2,	Japan	set	its	sights	on	new	techniques	for	industrialization.		“Whereas	German	products	had	long	been	at	the	top	of	the	quality	spectrum,	Japanese	products	were	at	the	bottom”	(Best	137).		Rather	than	attempting	to	follow	the	American	manufacturing	system,	the	Japanese	decided	to	implement	four	new	strategies.		These	new	techniques	would	propel	Japan	to	expand	extremely	rapidly	between	1946	and	1976.		The	strategies	that	would	transform	Japan	were	low	wage,	scale	economies,	focus	and	overhead	economies	and	flexible	production.		These	methods	were	unique	and	created	an	entirely	new	form	of	industrial	manufacturing.					Low	wages	were	the	initial	strategy	implemented	by	Japan	to	optimize	the	nation’s	labor	resource.		During	the	post-war	period,	this	was	one	of	few	Japanese	available	assets.		
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The	country	managed	to	optimize	industries	that	were	labor	intensive	in	order	to	maximize	the	available	resource.		The	Japanese	paid	workers	very	little	as	the	large	supply	of	laborers	allowed	little	bargaining	power	for	the	people.		This	technique	would	reduce	the	manufacturing	industry’s	cost	tremendously	during	the	mid	twentieth	century.			Japan’s	labor	cost	was	severely	lower	than	that	of	the	United	States	and	Europe	in	the	manufacturing	industries.		This	allowed	the	Japanese	to	produce	goods	that	were	also	at	a	substantial	discount.		The	low	production	costs,	in	relation	to	competitors,	meant	Japanese	profit	margins	could	exceed	the	foreign	companies	while	selling	less	expensive	goods.		Low	priced	goods	exposed	Japan	to	available	exchange	in	other	parts	of	the	world.		As	the	United	States	could	not	compete	with	Japanese	prices,	demand	for	these	foreign	goods	rose.		This	alone,	however,	was	not	enough	to	fully	transform	the	Japanese	industrial	sector.			According	to	Best,	Japan’s	next	industrial	strategy	was	to	use	scale	economies.		Economies	of	scale	use	high	volume	production	processes	to	reduce	the	marginal	cost	and	increase	profit	margins.		The	process	required	greater	one	time	costs	in	the	early	stages	but	would	reduce	the	production	cost	by	allowing	firms	to	produce	large	quantities	at	low	prices.			The	Japanese	investments,	like	Carnegie’s,	would	not	have	been	justified	on	a	discounted	cash	flow	rate	of	return	basis.		They	were	long-term	strategic	investments	to	penetrate	markets…	after	many	years	they	began	to	pay	for	themselves	because	cost	economies	were	sufficient	to	establish	market	dominance.	(Best	141).				While	the	Japanese	had	to	take	a	risk	in	initially	investing	greatly	into	the	production	process,	it	paid	off	for	the	country	by	reducing	manufacturing	costs	in	the	long	run.		
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Without	doing	so,	the	Japanese	may	not	have	been	able	to	penetrate	the	global	market	or	account	for	nearly	the	same	level	of	exports.			Once	scale	economies	were	in	place,	the	Japanese	could	begin	working	on	efficient	production.		Using	focus	and	overhead	economies,	the	Japanese	concentrated	much	more	meticulously	on	the	production	line.		Rather	than	having	multiple	production	lines	manufacturing	several	different	products,	the	Japanese	created	a	single	line	that	produced	high	volumes	of	one	product.		This	strategy	reduced	the	overhead	cost	and	complications	that	came	with	producing	multiple	items.		Due	to	their	higher	overhead	costs,	the	American	firms	were	not	able	to	compete	with	the	low	price	point	of	Japanese	products.		The	Japanese	knew	they	could	later	expand	efficient	production	but	the	single	production	line	set	the	foundation	for	market	development	and	global	competition.			Flexible	production	became	Japan’s	next	step	into	competing	with	global	giants	in	America	and	Europe.		While	focus	and	overhead	economies	allowed	Japan	to	initially	out	price	the	competition,	they	had	to	expand	in	order	to	compete	with	America’s	multiple	production	lines.		“The	first	three	strategies	were	cost	dominated,	but	the	emphasis	shifted	from	conserving	costs	of	direct	to	indirect	labor…	the	fourth	is	distinguished	by	an	endogenous	capacity	of	Japanese	firms	to	improve	continuously”	(Best	140).		Japanese	ingenuity	and	development	of	their	existing	processes	allowed	them	to	expand	without	increasing	costs.		Efficiency	was	key	to	expanding	in	Japan	and	the	Japanese	industries	did	not	rush	into	the	process.		This	development	is	what	built	Japan	into	the	manufacturing	power	that	it	is	today.			Michael	Best’s	description	of	Japanese	business	in	relation	to	the	Americans	gives	no	doubt	that	the	foreign	firms	were	manufacturing	things	better.		Unlike	American	big	
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business	techniques,	Japanese	and	European	firms	sought	to	drive	productivity	and	structure.		Best	describes	the	Japanese	rising	industry,	or	New	Competition,	as,	“not	about	maximizing	profits	for	a	given	material,	product,	process,	and	organizational	method,	but	about	seeking	a	competitive	advantage	by	continuously	upgrading	product,	process	and	organization”	(144).		This	new	foreign	system	of	manufacturing	is	consistently	upgrading	and	bettering	its	manufacturing	techniques.		This	began	a	new	line	of	thinking	among	automobile	manufacturers.		Rather	than	competing	exclusively	for	profit	the	Japanese	aimed	towards	competitive	advantage.		This	means	that	the	companies	tried	outperforming	those	in	America	using	efficient	techniques.			In	using	the	efficient	techniques	the	Japanese	had	developed	over	its	years	of	industrializing,	the	speed	developed	was	faster	than	ever	expected.		By	investing	resources	to	develop	the	best	techniques	in	the	beginning,	the	Japanese	set	themselves	up	for	success	later	on.		Best	writes,		In	a	little	over	two	decades,	the	Japanese	steel	industry	did	what	Carnegie	had	done	a	hundred	years	before:	international	production	leadership	was	established	by	investing	heavily	in	the	latest	steel-making	technologies	which	enable	it	to	drive	costs	below	the	competition.	(141).				Unlike	the	Americans,	however,	the	Japanese	did	not	see	a	successful	technique	as	one	to	stand	by	but	rather	one	to	continually	improve	and	develop	on.				
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United	States	Big	Business		 The	American	business	has	always	been	unique	in	the	bigger	picture	of	global	industry.		Early	industrialization	and	innovation	have	pushed	the	country	to	move	rapidly	over	time.		The	shared	traits	of	these	quickly	expanding	businesses	all	circle	around	large-scale	production	models.		In	America,	bigger	is	better	and	producing	more	leads	to	selling	and	earning	more.		The	Americans	believe	where	there	is	room	to	improve,	there	is	also	room	to	make	more.				 American	industry	sought	to	capitalize	on	the	ability	to	produce	large	quantities	at	a	lower	cost.		Rather	than	focusing	on	the	product	they	were	producing,	US	firms	were	concentrating	on	the	quantity	they	could	manufacture.		This	started	an	American	trend	of	mass	production	that	created	large	volumes	at	lower	prices.			Mass	production	relaxes	the	constraint	of	rising	marginal	costs	which,	in	turn,	creates	a	strategic	possibility	not	open	to	the	firm	in	the	perfect	competition	model:	the	mass	producer	can	react	to	a	condition	of	excess	supply	by	increasing	supply.		The	strategy	would	be	to	increase	market	share	and	compensate	for	lower	margins	with	higher	volume	(Best	74).				
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This	theory	of	manufacturing	creates	compromise,	as	quantity	is	the	driving	force.		Other	factors	such	as	cost	and	price	were	seen	by	American	big	businesses	as	flexible	around	quantity.	In	1919,	after	near	bankruptcy	due	to	a	lack	of	inventory,	General	Motors	reorganized	the	company	structure.		They	adopted	the	system	of	“standard	pricing”	created	by	Donaldson	Brown.		Brown	stated	“the	object	of	management	is	not	necessarily	the	highest	attainable	rate	of	return	on	capital,	but	rather	the	highest	return	consistent	with	attainable	volume”	(Best	66).		This	meant	that	GM	would	not	adjust	prices	based	on	the	costs	of	the	business	cycle	but	would	keep	prices	constant	to	dramatically	even	out	profits.		This	initiated	General	Motor’s	process	of	mass	production	as	they	could	reduce	costs	by	increasing	production	while	keeping	prices	the	same.	Ford	desired	to	make	a	product	that	everyone	could	afford.		Henry	Ford’s	“approach	to	sector	regulation	was	to	establish	Ford	Motor	Company	as	the	lowest	cost	producer	and	dominate	the	industry	to	such	an	extent	that	he	could	ignore	competitors”	(Best	78).		This	competitive	attitude	is	what	drove	the	American	companies	to	produce.		In	order	to	increase	consumer	consumption,	Ford	raised	the	wages	of	his	workers	so	they	would	become	customers.		He	was	looking	to	mass	produce	at	the	largest	scale	possible.			The	Americans	became	consumed	by	increasing	output	to	compete	on	the	price	of	their	vehicles.		In	Game	Theory	economics,	this	is	known	as	the	Bertrand	economic	model,	in	which	firms	choose	their	price	in	the	market	competing	with	identical	products	as	the	competitors.		As	said	by	Best,	“General	Motors	did	not	plan	for	the	New	Competition”	(80),	meaning	the	Americans	were	not	concerned	with	the	strategies	of	foreign	firms.		American	companies	believed	that	by	reducing	the	price	of	their	vehicles	in	relation	to	foreign	
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companies,	their	product	would	be	more	appealing.		In	cheapening	their	product,	American	auto	manufacturers	believed	they	could	entice	buyers	away	from	the	more	expensive	foreigners.		While	this	worked	for	some	time,	American	build	quality	began	to	negatively	affect	the	companies.		The	smaller	firms	in	foreign	countries	like	Japan	and	Germany	learned	and	practiced	new	production	techniques	and	slowly	established	more	technological	developments.		They	also	began	gaining	market	power	to	move	successfully	into	the	industry.				 The	American	focus	turned	into	a	strict	desire	for	profits.		The	system	of	producing	more	and	charging	less	was	the	sole	strategy	in	earning	more	money.		The	firms	did	not	look	at	this	in	the	long	run	but	exclusively	in	the	short	run;	a	short	run	price	competition	against	much	smaller	companies	that	were	emerging.		The	Americans	knew	the	small	firms	could	not	produce	the	quantity	of	output	at	their	price	and	sought	to	drive	them	out	of	the	market.		Rather	than	continuing	the	innovation	that	built	the	country,	the	American	automakers	halted	their	progression	and	exclusively	used	these	older	techniques.		This	was	a	crucial	error,	as	the	Americans	would	have	to	then	play	catch	up	decades	later.			The	United	States	automotive	industry	has	always	been	a	powerful	force	within	the	country.		With	up	and	down	market	fluctuations,	rarely	did	it	ever	occur	that	the	country’s	automobile	companies	would	be	in	jeopardy	of	going	out	of	business.		In	1953	Charles	Wilson,	the	then	president	of	General	Motors,	declared,	“As	General	Motors	goes	so	does	the	nation”.		Today,	no	American	automobile	manufacturer	would	dare	to	make	such	a	declaration.		The	American	auto	industry	has	been	in	a	slow	decline	since	its	peak	during	the	mid	twentieth	century.		Many	have	argued	the	reason	for	the	decline	but	no	one	can	positively	identify	the	element	or	elements	behind	it.		
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Recounting	what	was	stated	above,	American	firms	have	had	a	fixation	with	large	industry.		This	obsession	began	early	in	American	industrialization	with	the	construction	of	the	railroad	system	and	Andrew	Carnegie’s	steel	business.		According	to	Best,		Once	 the	 railroads	 were	 established.	 Big	 Business	 emerged	 rapidly	 in	 those	industries	in	which	high	throughput	technologies	could	be	deployed.		Driving	costs	down	by	 administrative	 coordination	 created	profits	 in	 the	 form	of	 quasi-rents	 to	the	early	birds	in	a	sector.	 	Followers,	however,	had	to	struggle	for	a	market	share	against	a	firm	already	achieving	throughput	economies.	(48-49).				This	exemplifies	the	American	system	of	business	in	terms	of	scalability.		US	industries	will	attempt	to	expand	as	rapidly	as	possible	in	order	to	dominate	the	market.		With	new	industry,	it	becomes	a	race	as	to	which	firm	can	do	this	fastest	with	the	goal	to	push	all	other	competitors	out.		American	automobile	manufacturers	used	this	same	technique	while	competing	with	foreign	carmakers.		Pushing	high	quantities	with	large	price	discounts	was	believed	to	exclude	companies	in	Europe	and	Asia.			The	Americans	did	not	foresee	the	numerous	downsides	that	would	form	as	a	result	of	such	industrial	large-scale	structure.	“American	Big	Business	suffers	from	rigid	command	and	control	production	organizations”	(Best	7).		Large	corporate	structure	comes	with	strict	protocols	that	slow	and	limit	internal	change.		Unlike	smaller	firms	that	were	forming	internationally,	American	big	business	was	slow	to	implement	changes	where	need	be.		This	slowed	the	American	progress	as	the	market	dynamic	continued	to	change.		“American	competitors	who	invested	on	the	basis	of	rate	of	return	for	given	production	methods	found	themselves,	too	late,	with	declining	market	shares	and	loss-making	operations.		The	lesson	of	Carnegie’s	overwhelming	of	the	British	Steel	industry	had	been	forgotten	in	America”	(Best	141).		The	Big	Three	automakers	were	able	to	survive	with	their	lack	of	innovation	until	substantial	changes	occurred	around	the	world.			
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American	Automotive	Trend		 In	the	early	1980s,	Ford,	Chrysler	and	General	Motors	all	produced	compact	pickup	trucks	and	SUVs	in	response	to	high	gas	prices	at	the	end	of	the	1970s.		Pickup	trucks	had	already	been	around	for	decades	and	a	few	sport	utility	vehicles,	such	as	the	Willys	Jeep,	were	being	produced	as	early	as	1965.		However,	these	cars	maintained	a	presence	in	niche	markets	and	were	not	marketed	toward	the	masses.		As	gas	prices	began	decreasing	through	the	1980s,	the	market	opened	up	for	the	possibility	of	larger	vehicles.		The	Jeep	Cherokee,	Chevrolet	Blazer	and	Ford	Bronco	II	all	debuted	in	1983	and	1984	aimed	at	better	gas	mileage	compared	to	older	large	vehicles.		These	models	began	selling	in	much	greater	numbers	than	anyone	expected.		About	a	year	later,	the	full-sized	pickup	truck	and	SUV	market	followed	the	same	trend.		A	sudden	popularity	of	SUVs	was	especially	unexpected	and	remarkable.		Between	1982	and	1985	the	sales	of	SUVs	jumped	from	132,000	to	over	800,000	(McCarthy).				 In	addition	to	the	lower	oil	prices,	falling	interest	rates	and	reduced	inflation	opened	the	door	for	light	trucks	and	SUVs.		The	US	auto	companies	benefited	from	the	improved	economic	condition	and	unpredicted	change	in	consumer	preference.		Baby	Boomers	paved	
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the	way	for	SUVs	in	the	mass	market,	as	they	were	buying	more	of	these	vehicles	than	any	other	group.		This	generation	was	the	first	to	begin	substituting	light	trucks	for	their	cars.		“The	median	age	of	SUV	buyers	in	1987,	for	example,	was	thirty-five	when	the	median	age	of	buyers	for	many	domestic	car	lines	was	over	fifty”	(McCarthy	232-233).		The	tough,	off-road	capabilities	of	these	new	vehicles	resonated	with	the	younger	audience.		 While	the	trend	began	by	the	image	of	greater	access	to	outdoor	recreational	activities,	only	about	10	percent	of	SUVs	in	the	1980s	were	being	used	off-road.		The	illusion	of	being	used	in	the	“wild	outdoors”	covered	up	the	environmental	problems	the	vehicles	had.		According	to	psychologist	Timothy	D.	Wilson,	the	indirect	advertising	of	SUVs	motivated	Americans	in	the	1980s	and	90s,	to	consider	themselves	outdoorsy,	adventurous	people	(McCarthy).		The	association	with	the	outdoors	became	a	trend	during	this	time,	especially	with	American	men.		Market	researcher	Thomas	F.	O’Grady	stated,	“even	though	they	are	used	mostly	on	the	road,	sports	utilities	fit	people’s	images	of	themselves.		They	project	a	rugged,	tough	image	that	some	people	like.”	(McCarthy	234-235).		Americans	also	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	to	eliminate	station	wagons	in	exchange	for	the	new	sport	utility	vehicles.		Having	more	space	within	the	vehicle	for	children	and	pets	no	longer	meant	sacrificing	style.		 The	sport	utility	vehicle	quickly	became	a	fashion	statement	in	American	society.		The	automotive	trend	had	a	major	shift	toward	taller,	boxier	motor	vehicles.		This	was	a	large	contrast	from	the	long,	low	cars	of	the	1970s,	such	as	the	Cadillac	Eldorado,	Ford	Thunderbird	and	Chrysler	Imperial.		The	SUV	arrived	as	a	long	awaited	change	in	automotive	styling	after	years	of	monotony.		This	resulted	in	huge	demand	for	something	new	and	different.		Consumers,	manufacturers	and	media	all	embraced	this	desire	with	the	
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SUV.		General	Motors,	Ford	and	Chrysler	all	rejoiced	the	new	trend	and	dominated	the	market,	as	foreign	competitors	were	not	creating	the	same	vehicles.		Foreign	companies	such	the	Japanese	manufacturer,	Suzuki,	tried	entering	this	new	market	by	creating	small,	low-budget	sport	utility	vehicles	like	the	Samurai.		However,	these	smaller	SUVs	never	caught	on	in	the	United	States	as	people	were	looking	for	larger	vehicles.				 During	the	1980s,	scientists	had	already	begun	doing	research	on	the	impact	of	the	automobile	to	the	environment.		Global	warming	was	a	validated	theory	among	scientists	and	the	dangers	of	gasoline	consumption	were	becoming	apparent.		However,	neither	this	nor	the	dangers	of	SUVs,	such	as	rollovers,	seemed	to	affect	consumers.		Sport	utility	vehicle	sales	continued	to	grow	as	low	gas	prices	signaled	opportunity	for	larger	and	larger	vehicles	for	customers.		People	were	looking	for	an	alternative	to	the	minivan	that	had	a	‘cooler’	image.		The	Jeep	Cherokee	was	one	of	the	first	to	do	this	and	the	other	American	manufacturers	such	responded	with	models	such	as	the	Ford	Explorer	in	1990.		The	Explorer	became	the	pinnacle	of	SUVs	in	the	US,	immediately	becoming	the	best-selling	four-door	SUV	in	its	first	year.		Between	1975	and	1992,	the	percent	of	SUVs	in	America	nearly	doubled	from	19	percent	to	37.4	percent	of	all	passenger	vehicle	sales	(McCarthy).		According	to	Tom	McCarthy,	by	1997	nearly	half	of	new	vehicles	sold	in	the	United	States	were	light	trucks.		The	economic	condition	at	the	time	allowed	high	asset	turnover	for	the	American	carmakers	as	SUV	sales	were	booming.		As	we	will	discuss	in	a	later	chapter,	this	paired	with	high	profit	margins	from	low	costs	and	a	lack	of	foreign	competition	made	the	American	automakers	greedy.				 During	this	time	of	huge	growth	in	the	sport	utility	vehicle,	neither	consumers	nor	regulators	were	concerned	with	the	emissions	of	these	automobiles.		The	regulations	on	
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these	vehicles	were	lightly	regulated	and	some	SUVs	“emitted	as	much	as	five	and	a	half	times	more	smog-causing	pollutants	per	mile	than	cars”	(McCarthy	240).		SUVs	were	larger	and	heavier	than	cars,	consumed	much	more	fuel	and	produced	more	carbon	dioxide.		“Under	EPCA,	Congress	permitted	light	trucks	to	meet	less	stringent	fuel	economy	standards	than	cars”	(McCarthy	241).		The	American	auto	industry	was	balancing	on	the	current	low	oil	prices	and	a	lack	of	innovation.		As	we	will	discuss	below,	this	dynamic	was	supported	by	easy	credit	policies	on	the	part	of	financial	institutions.		“Prior	to	the	financial	crisis,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	concentrated	on	producing	larger,	less-fuel-efficient,	and	more-costly-to-produce	models	than	their	competitors,	and	offered	aggressive	price	discounts	to	consumers”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	14).		It	was	these	practices	that	drove	the	companies	to	fall	as	the	oil	market	changed.				
Domestic	Transplant	Carmakers	The	turn	of	the	century	marked	the	tipping	point	for	the	Big	Three	automakers.		Oil	prices	began	to	rise	and	Americans	began	trading	in	their	large	SUVs	for	small,	fuel-efficient	foreign	cars.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	began	dramatically	losing	profits	in	the	mid	2000s.		With	their	poor	performance,	one	of	the	first	measures	was	to	begin	laying	off	workers.		From	2003	to	2013,	the	employment	from	the	US	automakers	fell	by	nearly	50%	ending	in	approximately	253,000	in	2013.			During	the	same	period,	foreign	companies	such	as	Toyota	and	Honda	were	increasing	production	and	employment	within	the	United	States.		These	companies	from	Asia	and	Europe	who	are	producing	their	product	on	US	soil	are	know	as	domestic	transplant	carmakers	(DTCs).		Domestic	transplant	companies	have	been	steadily	
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increasing	production	and	nearly	doubled	employment	to	163,000	by	2013	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger).		Goolsbee	and	Krueger	state	that	the	American	employment	differences	between	US	and	domestic	automakers	show	evidence	that	the	problems	within	the	Big	Three	automakers	were	unique	to	them	and	not	foreign	manufacturers.			The	problem	with	the	domestic	transplant	companies	is	the	difference	in	wage	and	labor	cost	from	the	US	firms.		During	the	government	restructuring,	General	Motors	agreed	to	reduce	employment	from	96,000	to	45,000	by	2012	in	order	to	have	similar	labor	costs	as	the	DTCs.		“Estimates	of	the	hourly	compensation	of	the	Big	Three	automakers	put	hourly	compensation	almost	25	percent	higher	than	in	the	transplants”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	6).	Higher	costs	for	the	US	companies	were	created	by	inflated	wages	and	labor	unions.		This	was	one	more	element	that	the	Big	Three	were	battling	while	trying	to	compete	with	foreign	manufacturers.	
	
Government	Bailout	Up	to	2009,	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	endured	a	continuous	decline,	logging	some	of	the	“worst	corporate	performances	in	American	history”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	4).		In	just	a	few	years,	US	auto	sales	plummeted	from	a	peak	of	more	than	17	million	vehicles	per	year	to	below	10	million	in	2009.		Sales	were	deeply	affected	by	“the	widespread	perception	of	perennial	quality	and	reliability	issues,	lower	resale	values,	poorly	received	new	models,	and	a	lack	of	low-gas-mileage	cars	at	times	of	rising	fuel	costs”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	5).		The	American	car	companies	were	in	a	bad	spot	and	it	was	clear	bankruptcy	was	inevitable	if	things	did	not	change.	
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Austan	D.	Goolsbee	and	Alan	B.	Krueger	were	directly	involved	with	the	government	automotive	bailout	during	2008-2009.		The	decision	to	assist	three	major	US	businesses	on	the	brink	of	bankruptcy	was	disputed	amongst	many	Americans	during	the	time.		To	this	day	many	still	argue	that	a	failing	business	should	have	to	pay	the	price	for	producing	a	subpar	product.		However,	the	fait	of	the	three	automotive	giants	would	not	only	affect	the	workers	who	were	employed	by	General	Motors,	Ford	and	Chrysler	but	also	every	other	individual	living	in	the	United	States.		Whether	the	government	assisted	the	companies	or	not,	the	American	economy	would	be	affected	in	a	major	way.	In	the	last	quarter	of	2008,	the	CEOs	of	all	Big	Three	auto	manufacturers	requested	a	“bridge	loan”	of	25	billion	dollars	from	the	United	States	government	in	order	to	remain	afloat.		The	three	men	blamed	their	companies’	downturn	on	the	“Nation’s	financial	meltdown.”		Chrysler	CEO	Robert	Nardelli	claimed	that	a	shortage	of	credit	caused	by	the	recessionary	economy	was	to	blame	for	lack	of	auto	sales.		The	company	heads	tried	to	fool	the	public	into	believing	the	economy	was	at	fault	for	the	American	auto	performance.		However,	as	examined	in	the	following	chapter,	the	figures	for	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	prove	Robert	Nardelli	and	the	other	CEOs	very	wrong.	As	the	Big	Three	auto	executives	begged	the	government	for	money,	they	were	criticized	for	internal	company	weakness.		Skepticism	spread	over	whether	the	auto	companies	could	ever	recover	due	to	the	poor	business	that	had	plagued	the	industry.		Critics	highlighted	issues	of	“high	cost,	questionable	quality,	and	the	like	as	factors	contributing	to	the	industry’s	troubles	during	the	financial	crisis.”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	5).		While	the	CEOs	claimed	they	had	fixed	these	problems,	Goolsbee	and	Krueger	say	that	
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the	problems	had	been	building	for	years	and	the	economic	recession	was	certainly	not	the	sole	reason	behind	their	decline.			When	the	issue	developed	in	front	of	the	Obama	administration,	the	main	concern	was	extreme	job	loss	in	the	United	States.		The	firms	would	lay	off	all	workers	if	things	continued	the	way	they	were	going.		In	2009,	the	Congressional	Oversight	Panel	said	that	a	collapse	of	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	would	be	“a	potentially	crippling	blow	to	the	American	economy	that	Treasury	estimated	would	eliminate	nearly	1.1	million	jobs.”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	8).		It	was	estimated	at	the	time,	that	a	liquidation	of	Chrysler	on	its	own	would	result	in	the	loss	of	approximately	300,000	jobs	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger).		This	kind	of	result	would	produce	a	huge	increase	in	US	unemployment	numbers	as	well	as	great	costs	to	the	government	such	as	health	care,	unemployment	insurance	and	additional	programs	that	come	with	increased	unemployment.			The	alternative	option	to	providing	a	rescue	plan,	therefore,	could	prove	just	as,	if	not	more,	costly	to	the	nation.	As	the	government	is	naturally	risk-averse,	the	answer	predictably	leans	toward	the	conservative	choice.		In	order	to	avoid	the	risk	of	a	massive	boom	in	unemployment	and	hit	to	the	economy,	the	decision	was	made	to	assist	the	auto	industry.		Clearly	it	would	be	devastating	for	three	giant	firms	to	fail	at	the	same	so	some	assistance	was	necessary.		The	government	now	had	to	chose	the	level	of	assistance	to	provide,	as	the	choice	to	help	one,	two	or	all	three	of	the	companies	was	still	pending.				 Despite	enduring	significant	losses,	Ford	chose	not	to	take	government	support.		While	the	United	States	government	lent	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	more	than	$20	billion	at	the	end	of	2008	just	to	hold	the	companies	over	until	a	bailout	decision	was	made,	Ford	opted	out.		The	company	“had	borrowed	a	significant	amount	of	money	in	2006	and	
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begun	restructuring	before	the	financial	crisis	struck”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	7).		Because	Ford	planned	further	ahead	than	GM	and	Chrysler	they	were	able	to	withstand	an	economic	recession	better.		This	is	an	indication	that	incompetence	and	a	lack	of	planning	may	have	played	factors	in	the	degree	of	failure	from	the	other	two	firms.			The	money	that	was	leant	to	GM	and	Chrysler	at	the	end	of	2008	was	in	order	to	prevent	bankruptcy	in	the	short-term.		Congress	was	still	deciding	upon	the	bailout	but	had	to	adjourn	for	the	holidays.		As	the	two	firms	were	at	risk	of	failing	in	the	time	before	a	decision	was	made	in	early	2009,	the	government	chose	to	lend	over	$20	billion.		This	money	came	out	of	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program	(TARP)	using	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act.		While	$17.5	billion	went	toward	the	automakers,	the	remainder	of	the	loan	was	given	to	the	two	associated	financial	groups.		Combined,	General	Motors	Acceptance	Corporation	(GMAC)	and	Chrysler	Financial	received	over	$2.5	billion.		As	shown	below,	these	financial	institutions	played	a	huge	role	in	the	American	automotive	industry	during	this	time.	Internal	debate	over	the	final	bailout	eventually	settled	upon	the	topic	of	Chrysler.		A	large	number	of	people	believed	that	the	smallest	of	the	Big	Three	would	not	survive,	even	after	government	interference	and	support.		In	a	meeting	over	the	automotive	bailouts	in	March	2009,	Goolsbee	and	Krueger	both	stated	they	did	not	believe	Chrysler	would	survive	another	five	years.		This	was	also	the	majority	opinion	among	the	Obama	administration’s	economic	and	auto	team.			Our	analysis	suggested	that	a	failure	of	the	much	smaller	Chrysler,	however,	would	probably	not	have	systemic	effects	for	the	whole	industry	and	that	rescuing	the	company	would	make	it	more	difficult	and	more	costly	for	taxpayers	to	rescue	GM,	although	we	recognized	that	a	failure	of	Chrysler	would	cause	considerable	hardship	to	its	workers	and	their	families	and	communities	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	4).	
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	The	Chrysler	auto	sales	had	plummeted	in	the	short	period	between	2006	and	2009.		In	addition,	Goolsbee	and	Krueger	state	that	industry	research	led	them	to	believe	that	current	Chrysler	customers	would	most	likely	turn	to	a	different	American	car	maker	in	the	event	of	Chrysler	going	out	of	business.		One	hope	for	the	company	was	a	reconstruction	through	being	acquired	by	another	firm,	as	there	was	prospect	in	Fiat	obtaining	the	company.		However,	Chrysler	had	already	merged	twice	before,	once	with	Daimler-Benz	in	1998	and	later	with	Cerberus	in	2007.		Neither	of	these	previous	acquisitions	had	proved	successful	so	a	third	looked	less	hopeful.				 While	hope	for	Chrysler	was	slim,	the	company	maintained	several	strong	pillars	that	could	hold	it	up.		Chrysler	contained	its	other	automotive	branches:	Jeep,	Dodge,	SRT	and	Ram	trucks.		Some	of	these	divisions	were	much	more	successful	than	the	overall	company.		It	was	even	discussed	whether	Chrysler	could	survive	by	saving	its	minivan	and	Jeep	units.		The	decision	was	eventually	made	to	save	Chrysler,	along	with	GM,	in	a	resolution	that	“was	based	more	on	political	and	social	reality,”	according	to	Rattner.		“President	Obama	heard	the	analysis	on	all	sides	of	the	issue.		He	concluded	that	the	economy	should	not	risk	the	failure	of	both	companies	in	2009	and	opted	to	rescue	both	General	Motors	and	Chrysler”	(Goolsbee	and	Krueger	12).	President	Obama	rejected	the	initial	restructuring	proposal	by	Chrysler	and	General	Motors	and	demanded	a	more	severe	reorganization	attempt.		The	government	recruited	a	team	of	private	sector	turnaround	experts	that	would	lead	efforts	to	fix	GM	and	Chrysler.		Debate	finally	settled	and	the	US	Treasury	Department	lent	$51	billion	to	General	Motors	and	$12.5	billion	to	Chrysler.		In	addition	to	the	two	auto	companies,	the	bailout	and	restructuring	would	also	apply	to	each	firm’s	affiliated	financing	company	and	auto	parts	
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supplier.		GMAC	received	$17.2	billion	as	part	of	the	rescue	package	totaling	over	$80	billion	in	government	loans.		The	American	auto	industry	was	in	the	same	condition	as	the	big	banks	that	had	tipped	the	financial	crisis.		The	devastating	state	of	the	Big	Three	by	2009	alludes	to	a	plethora	of	bad	business	practices	and	strategies	that	far	exceeded	the	condition	of	the	national	economic	condition.			
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2.		Measuring	the	Fall	of	an	Industry	
The	automotive	bailout	has	been	criticized	harshly	since	the	initiative	began	in	2007.		Many	people	within	and	outside	the	United	States	do	not	agree	with	the	decision	to	aid	the	failing	companies.		This	belief	expresses	that	if	your	firm	fails	to	profit	in	the	industry,	then	it	deserves	to	go	out	of	business	like	any	smaller	business.		In	the	previous	chapter	we	discussed	the	American	auto	CEOs	suggesting	it	was	not	their	fault	for	their	poor	performance	and	rather	the	fault	of	the	economic	condition.		However,	it	is	evident	that	American	production	strategy	was	highly	flawed	in	comparison	with	foreign	companies.			Why	then,	did	the	United	States	government	feel	the	need	to	prevent	American	auto	companies	from	going	into	bankruptcy?		This	suggests	the	companies’	success	has	direct	and	indirect	effects.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	are	three	giants	in	America	today.		Each	one	individually	holds	a	great	amount	of	power	in	the	United	States	economy.		The	impact	of	changes	in	extremely	large	companies	is	much	deeper	than	that	of	most	firms	that	are	medium	to	small	in	size.		Large	corporations	like	the	Big	Three	automakers	affect	large	economic	factors	such	as	job	creation,	consumer	spending	and	economic	growth.		An	upset	in	any	or	all	of	these	items	is	harmful	to	the	country	as	a	whole.		In	the	case	of	the	United	States,	if	Ford,	General	Motors	and/or	Chrysler	are	upset	or	altered,	the	resultant	will	ripple	through	the	American	economy.						
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Fuel	Economy	
One	explanation	for	the	decline	in	US	automobiles	is	the	increase	in	oil	prices.		Figure	2.1	displays	the	price	of	US	regular	gasoline	between	1992	and	2014.		Prior	to	2000,	prices	remained	relatively	stable	at	a	little	over	one	dollar	per	gallon.		It	was	during	this	time	of	the	1990s	that	American	SUVs	were	booming.		The	Big	Three	seemed	to	have	little	concern	for	producing	vehicles	with	good	fuel	economy.		This	was	the	time	that	cars	and	trucks	became	bigger	and	bigger	as	Americans	embraced	the	low	costs.				
	
Figure	2.1:		US	national	regular	gas	prices	in	dollars	per	gallon		However,	the	figure	shows	that	after	2000,	there	is	an	extreme	upturn	in	oil	prices.		Around	this	time	Americans	began	replacing	their	big	cars	and	SUVs	with	smaller	cars	in	order	to	save	fuel.		By	this	time	it	was	too	late	for	the	American	companies.		Years	of	
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developing	large,	non-fuel	efficient	vehicles	meant	they	were	not	ready	for	such	a	change.		The	foreign	companies	from	Germany	and	Japan	had	instead	spent	the	past	several	decades	developing	more	efficient	and	compact	machines.		As	a	result,	these	small	vehicles	became	the	popular	trend	as	people	could	no	longer	afford	to	fuel	their	big	cars	and	trucks.		 Figure	2.2	shows	the	United	States	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	fuel	economy	rating	for	the	American	Big	Three	compared	with	two	Japanese	brands,	Honda	and	Toyota.		The	EPA	is	responsible	for	monitoring	and	rating	the	fuel	efficiency	and	emissions	of	each	vehicle	on	the	road.		The	figure	shows	the	ratings	of	cars,	trucks	and	combined	between	1975	and	2015.		The	data	uses	the	average	of	all	of	the	cars	in	each	manufacturer’s	fleet.		In	addition,	the	bottom	row	of	the	figure	displays	the	percent	of	trucks	being	produced	from	a	manufacturer’s	fleet.		 		
	 28	
	
Figure	2.2:	Car	and	truck	fuel	economy	by	manufacturer	for	model	year	1975-2015	and	percent	trucks	being	sold.		
Graph	from	the	EPA	
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	 In	1990,	General	Motors,	Ford	and	Chrysler	(now	known	as	Fiat-Chrysler)	had	average	fuel	economies	of	around	20	miles	per	gallon	(MPG)	for	cars	and	trucks.		This	was	when	SUVs	were	becoming	very	popular	in	the	United	States.		At	the	same	time,	Toyota	and	Honda	had	average	fuel	economies	around	25	MPG.		That	is	25%	higher	than	the	American	level.		Between	1990	and	2000	the	graphs	show	little	progress	by	the	US	manufacturers.		The	lower	graphs	show	that	there	is	a	huge	increase	in	the	percent	of	trucks	being	produced	and	sold.		This	parallels	the	American	vehicle	taste	at	the	time.		This	also	leads	to	a	decrease	in	American	brand	overall	fuel	economy.		The	Big	Three	were	not	concerned	with	producing	fuel	efficient	or	small	vehicles.		As	the	Japanese	competitors	continue	to	innovate,	their	fuel	economy	continues	to	rise.			After	gas	prices	began	to	increase	and	the	size	of	vehicles	began	to	decrease,	the	Americans	finally	began	new	developments.		However,	by	this	time	it	was	already	too	late	and	they	were	far	behind	the	foreign	companies.		The	extent	of	this	is	still	present	in	recent	years.		In	their	annual	report	of	2014	model	year	vehicles,	the	EPA	stated	“Fiat-Chrysler	had	the	highest	CO2	emissions	and	lowest	fuel	economy,	followed	by	GM	[and]	Ford”	(Light-Duty	Automotive	Technology,	ES8).		The	same	was	true	of	2013	model	year	vehicle	ratings.		The	American	manufacturers’	lack	of	innovation	and	development	has	then	set	them	back	from	foreign	companies	for	over	a	decade.	
 
Quality	of	Automobiles	
	 The	high	fuel	economy	and	large	size	of	American	cars	was	not	the	sole	problem	with	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler.	The	downward	trend	in	American	vehicles	after	
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year	2000	points	toward	their	inferior	overall	product.		Other	companies	out	of	Japan	and	Germany	were	not	having	the	same	experience	as	the	Americans	in	selling	cars.		The	foreign	automakers	were	out-performing	using	a	greater	product	and	technological	development.				 Consumer	Reports	has	earned	the	title	as	the	standard	in	car	reviews	with	currently	over	one	million	subscribers.		Car	manufacturers	as	well	as	consumers	look	to	the	magazine	for	automotive	advice	and	references.		In	2004,	Consumer	Reports	published	their	best	and	worst	used	cars	of	the	year.			Every	year,	Consumer	Reports	conducts	an	extensive	survey	of	car	owners,	asking	them	about	serious	problems	that	have	cropped	up	in	the	past	12	months.		The	survey	generates	more	than	half	a	million	responses,	which	together	paint	a	detailed	picture	of	how	cars	up	to	eight	years	old	are	holding	up	(Buying	Guide	198).				This	reports	advises	consumers	as	to	which	vehicles	and	manufacturers	are	reliable	and	producing	the	best	products.		Buyers	look	to	Consumer	Reports	to	make	a	safe	purchase	and	to	avoid	bad	products.		 In	2004,	Consumer	reports	published	their	best	39	used	cars.		Of	these	39,	only	3	were	from	US	companies.		This	is	a	clear	indication	that	the	American	vehicles	reviewed	by	the	magazine’s	survey	concluded	poor	results.		This	is	even	more	evident	while	looking	at	the	worst	used	cars	in	2004.		28	cars	made	this	list	that	Consumer	Reports	described	as	having	“more	problems	than	average	over	multiple	years.		Buying	one	could	be	asking	for	trouble”	(2004	CR	201).		24	of	the	worst	28	were	vehicles	out	of	Ford,	General	Motors	or	Chrysler.		Due	to	the	poor	quality	and	engineering	of	their	product,	Consumer	Reports	told	their	audience	not	to	purchase	numerous	American	cars.			By	2009,	the	American	companies	still	had	not	improved.		Within	their	best	cars	section,	vehicles	are	separated	into	the	categories:	best	of	the	best,	family	cars,	upscale	
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cars,	luxury	cars,	sports	and	sporty	cars,	minivans,	small	SUVs,	midsized	and	large	SUVs,	and	Pickup	trucks.		Of	the	total	70	cars,	trucks	and	SUVs	that	they	recommended,	only	six	were	from	the	American	Big	Three.		In	addition,	no	American	car	was	rated	as	the	best	in	its	class.		Japanese	and	German	manufacturers	dominated	the	remainder	of	the	top	70	cars	and	trucks.				 To	make	things	worse,	the	American	companies	again	lead	Consumer	Reports’	“worst	of	the	worst”	category	in	2009.		The	magazine	gave	34	vehicles,	which	it	believed	to	be	the	worst	performing	cars,	trucks	and	SUVs.		Consumer	Reports	does	not	recommend	any	car	on	this	list	for	customers.		They	described	this	class	as	having	“multiple	years	of	much-worse-than-average	reliability	among	1999	to	2008	models”	(Best	and	Worst	Used).		Of	the	34	total,	22	were	American	cars.		It	is	no	surprise	that	American	cars	were	not	selling	as	reviews	and	advice-givers	were	telling	the	American	people	not	to	buy	the	products	out	of	General	Motors,	Ford	and	Chrysler.		Instead,	they	were	advising	consumers	to	purchase	from	the	Japanese	and	Germans.		 The	quality	and	poor	reviews	of	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	are	due	to	a	lack	of	innovation.		Figure	2.3	shows	a	series	of	graphs	that	display	different	auto	manufacturers’	development	of	variable	valve	timing.		Variable	valve	timing	(VVT)	is	an	advancement	within	fuel-injected	engines	that	improves	the	performance,	fuel	efficiency	and	emissions	of	the	motor.		The	figure	makes	it	clear	that	the	American	companies	are	innovating	much	later	than	the	others.		Chrysler,	Ford	and	GM	are	behind	the	fleet	average	by	many	years.				
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Figure	2.3:		Percent	of	vehicles	per	brand	with	variable	valve	timing.		Graph	from	Center	for	Automotive	Research	
	 Companies	like	Nissan,	Honda	and	Toyota	began	advancing	and	integrating	their	variable	valve	timing	technologies	in	the	early	1990s.		Chrysler	did	not	begin	making	cars	with	VVT	until	after	2005.		Ford	and	General	Motors	also	had	few	cars	in	their	fleet	with	variable	valve	timing	until	the	late	2000s.		This	is	the	same	story	with	multi-valves,	lockup	transmissions	and	front	wheel	drive.		All	of	these	developments	improve	efficiency	and	
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performance	in	modern	cars.		However,	the	Americans	trailed	foreign	competitors	with	each	one.		This	makes	it	clear	that	the	Big	Three	were	following	in	other	brands’	footsteps	rather	than	developing	their	own	new	technologies.	Besides	the	in-house	development	within	automotive	manufacturers,	car	companies	use	many	outside	suppliers	for	parts	they	do	not	develop	themselves.		The	supply	chain	is	a	crucial	element	to	any	big	business,	especially	an	automobile	manufacturer.		The	high	volume	of	outsourcing	parts	is	due	to	the	huge	number	of	parts	going	into	the	final	product	that	cannot	all	be	produced	by	a	single	producer.		Increased	sourcing	is	also	used	in	some	cases	to	reduce	costs.		Figure	2.4	from	the	Economic	Planning	Institute	shows	the	working	relationship	between	several	American	and	Japanese	auto	manufacturers	and	their	parts	suppliers.		The	graph	shows	that	before	the	recession	of	2008	the	relationship	between	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	and	their	corresponding	suppliers	was	very	poor.		In	relation,	the	Japanese	brands	shown	in	the	graph	maintained	adequate	to	good	relationships	with	their	suppliers	throughout	the	2000s.			
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Figure	2.4:		Auto	manufacturer	to	supplier	working	relations.		Graph	from	the	Center	for	Automotive	Research	 
  This	relationship	is	important	in	the	development	of	automobiles.		A	company	that	has	poor	relationships	with	its	suppliers	is	more	likely	to	change	suppliers	often.		This	means	that	there	will	be	less	development	and	innovation	within	the	parts	being	manufactured	for	specific	vehicles.		American	cars	and	trucks	are	therefore	less	likely	to	undergo	as	much	research	and	development	as	the	foreign	companies	with	good	supplier	working	relations.			
 
Stock	Performance	
	 The	innovation,	or	lack	there	of,	from	the	American	auto	companies	significantly	affected	company	performance.		The	stock	prices	of	the	Big	Three	demonstrate	how	poorly	
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the	companies	were	doing.		Figure	2.5	shows	the	evolution	of	Ford’s	stock	price	(F)	between	1990	and	20141.		The	figure	tracks	the	percent	growth	from	the	starting	point	in	1990	in	relation	to	the	change	in	the	S&P	500	index	through	the	same	period.		The	S&P	index	shows	the	market	pattern	of	the	largest	500	companies	with	common	stock	and	is	considered	one	of	the	best	representations	of	the	United	States	economy.		If	a	company	were	to	fluctuate	according	to	solely	the	economy,	their	stock	price	would	mostly	overlap	with	this	indicator.				
Figure	2.5:	S&P	500	vs.	Ford	from	1990-2014	
In	figure	2.5	above,	it	is	clear	that	Ford	and	the	S&P	500	are	not	following	the	same	path.		Rather,	there	is	a	great	deviation	between	the	price	of	Ford	stock	and	the	S&P	index.		Ford	is	greatly	underperforming	the	S&P	and	therefore	the	nation.		Between	1990	and	around	2001,	the	two	lines	follow	close	growth	patterns.		This	means	that	Ford	was	following	the	national	economic	progression	at	this	time.		However,	after	2000,	the	lines																																																									1	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	stock	information	was	not	available	before	2009	due	to	company	restructuring	and	acquisition	during	government	bailout.	
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grow	further	and	further	apart	until	there	is	little	parallel	between	them.		The	biggest	difference	is	between	2003	and	2007	as	Ford	undergoes	steady	decline	while	the	S&P,	and	therefore	the	nation,	grow	significantly.		This	is	representative	of	the	deterioration	the	US	automotive	industry	independent	of	economic	condition.	The	national	recession	is	clearly	indicated	in	2007	and	2008	as	the	S&P	500	has	a	huge	sudden	drop.		However,	Ford	only	declines	a	fraction	of	the	amount.		This	signifies	that	Ford	was	not	affected	by	the	recession	as	drastically	as	the	economy	as	a	whole.		While	the	S&P	500	drops	much	more	significantly,	its	growth	remains	far	above	the	single	firm.		Ford	was	in	a	devastating	place	at	this	time,	progressing	below	the	1990	stock	price.		The	graph	shows	the	decline	clearly	started	in	the	early	2000s	and	is	not	only	due	to	the	economic	recession.	The	graph	also	indicates	the	difference	in	overall	growth	during	this	period.	Starting	with	a	basis	of	zero,	the	S&P	500	grows	over	400%	over	fifteen	years.		Meaning,	the	S&P	500	price	was	over	four	times	higher	at	the	end	of	2014	than	the	start	of	1990.		This	is	a	long-term	upward	trend	that	can	be	expected	of	such	a	time	frame.		Ford	does	not	show	the	same	growth	and	only	gains	91%.		In	addition,	at	two	separate	points	in	the	span	of	time	Ford	drops	under	its	1990	stock	price.		This	is	something	that	is	not	even	close	to	the	S&P	500,	even	during	the	recession.					 Besides	being	far	behind	the	S&P	500	and	showing	very	poor	performance,	figure	2.6	shows	Ford’s	stock	price	compared	to	that	of	Wal-Mart	(WMT)	and	Honda	(HMC)	between	2004	and	2014.		This	graph	keeps	the	S&P	index	so	it	can	be	compared	additionally	to	the	other	companies.		Ford’s	stock	growth	remains	significantly	below	the	other	three	measures	for	nearly	the	entire	time	span.			
	 37	
	 	
	
Figure	2.6:		S&P	500,	Ford,	Wal-Mart	and	Honda	from	2004-2014		In	adding	Wal-Mart,	figure	2.6	now	looks	at	another	American	company	that	endured	the	same	economic	conditions	as	Ford.		Like	Ford’s	stock,	Wal-Mart’s	stock	price	is	below	the	S&P	average	between	2005	and	2009.		However,	it	stays	much	more	level	and	does	not	undergo	any	significant	declines	over	the	entire	ten-year	period.		Looking	at	the	entire	graph,	the	Wal-Mart	stock	follows	very	similar	levels	and	fluctuations	as	the	S&P.		This	is	especially	true	between	2009	and	2014	as	the	two	lines	have	a	great	amount	of	overlap.		This	evidences	that	the	overall	economy	was	not	responsible	for	the	downturn	of	Ford,	as	another	American	company	was	not	undergoing	the	same	trend.		 Looking	at	the	purple	line	in	the	graph,	Honda	is	now	compared	to	Ford	and	the	S&P	between	2004	and	2014.		This	line	stands	clearly	above	all	other	three	lines	for	the	entirety	of	the	figure.		As	Ford	is	undergoing	a	steady	decline	from	2004	to	2008,	Honda’s	stock	price	rises	for	most	of	this	period.		In	addition,	Honda	experiences	nearly	the	same	drop	
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during	2008	as	the	S&P	500.		This	means	that	the	foreign	carmaker	was	affected	in	a	very	similar	manner	by	the	financial	recession	as	the	American	economy.		Ford	and	Honda	stock	prices	experience	very	different	trends	that	are	signs	of	differentiated	development	for	each	firm.		This	illustrates	that	automakers	as	a	whole	were	not	bearing	the	same	deterioration	that	the	American	car	manufacturers	had.		 The	period	after	the	turn	of	the	century	marks	the	downfall	for	the	US	auto	industry.		During	the	bailout,	American	auto	CEOs	argued	the	economy	was	the	force	that	landed	the	companies	in	the	financial	whole	of	2008.		However,	figures	2.5	and	2.6	clearly	show	that	American	automakers	were	not	following	economic	trends	and	were	doing	more	poorly	than	other	US	and	automotive	companies.		Foreign	automakers	must	have	then	had	another	element	that	lead	to	their	superior	performance.		This	indicates	the	internal	causes	that	lead	to	the	crash	of	the	Big	Three.			
 
Automotive	Market	Share	
The	decline	of	the	American	auto	industry	is	further	exhibited	through	the	industry	market	share.		The	once	powerful	Big	Three	automakers	no	longer	dominate	the	market	as	figure	2.7	demonstrates.		The	three	pie	charts	illustrate	the	top	10	companies	with	the	highest	market	shares	in	the	automotive	industry	in	years	2000,	2006	and	2014.		The	differences	that	are	clearly	demonstrated	in	these	models	are	a	testament	to	the	change	in	industry	and	economy	over	14	years.		This	will	illuminate	the	decline	the	United	States	auto	companies	endured	that	was	examined	above.		
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Figure 2.7: Automotive global market shares in 2000, 2006 and 2014 using data from the International Organization of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers   
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	As	discussed	above,	2000	marked	the	tipping	point	for	the	auto	industry.		After	a	steady	period	of	enlarging	vehicles	and	increasing	business,	the	American	companies	were	at	the	top	of	the	industry.		As	shown	in	the	first	pie	chart	within	figure	2.7,	General	Motors	was	the	top	auto	manufacturer	in	2000,	holding	14.4	percent	of	the	automobile	market.		Ford	followed	GM	as	the	second	largest	with	12.9	percent	market	share.		The	smallest	of	the	US	Big	Three,	Chrysler,	also	showed	success	as	the	fifth	highest	market	shareholder	with	8.2	percent.		The	foreign	companies	out	of	Japan	and	Germany	do	not	have	nearly	the	same	influence	on	the	global	market	at	this	time.			By	2006,	the	market	had	already	undergone	a	big	turnaround.		The	American	companies	were	no	longer	dominating	the	auto	industry	and	foreign	competitors	were	controlling	more	and	more	of	the	market.		As	displayed	in	the	center	chart	of	figure	2.7,	while	General	Motors	was	still	on	the	top,	it	had	lost	over	one	percent	of	its	market	share	since	2000,	landing	at	13.2	percent.			Toyota	was	now	just	trailing	at	11.8	percent.		Ford	had	dropped	to	the	third	largest	automaker	and	plummeted	from	12.9	to	9.6	percent	market	share.		This	was	over	a	three	percent	decrease	in	only	six	years.		The	jump	between	2000	and	2006	also	shows	the	impact	that	Chrysler	was	enduring.		The	smaller	firm	lost	more	than	half	of	its	market	share	dropping	from	8.2	to	3.7	percent.		The	falling	numbers	indicated	the	dire	position	the	US	companies	were	in	at	this	time.		 Eight	years	later,	the	top	market	shares	show	a	complete	rearrangement.		By	2014,	General	Motors	no	longer	maintained	the	top	spot	but	instead	fell	all	the	way	to	the	third	highest	market	shareholder.		Between	2006	and	2014	GM	lost	2.8	percent	of	its	market	share	and	was	now	sitting	at	10.6	percent.		Toyota	now	led	the	industry	with	11.5	percent	
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of	the	global	market	share.		Volkswagen,	which	had	only	8.3	percent	in	2006,	now	controlled	10.9	percent	of	the	market	and	was	the	second	largest	automaker.		The	chart	shows	an	influx	of	new	foreign	manufacturers	controlling	the	market.		Hyundai,	a	Korean	company,	went	from	3.7	in	2006	to	8.8	percent	by	2014.		Ford	was	now	only	the	fifth	largest	supplier	of	vehicles	with	continued	decline	to	6.6	percent	market	share.		By	2014,	Chrysler	had	been	acquired	by	Fiat	and	was	now	under	Fiat	Chrysler	Automobiles	(FCA)	holding	5.4	percent	of	the	market.				 These	three	charts	show	a	strong	picture	of	the	changing	automotive	climate.		The	trend	of	big	American	cars	had	impacted	the	companies	in	the	long-term.		As	the	Big	Three	lost	significant	business	between	2000	and	now,	the	foreign	companies	showed	an	opposite	movement.		The	same	is	true	of	the	market	share	within	the	United	States.		Figure	2.8,	from	the	Center	for	Automotive	Research,	shows	the	downward	trend	that	all	three	American	automotive	brands	have	in	the	US	market.		General	Motors,	Ford	and	Chrysler	continue	to	have	declining	US	market	share	over	the	duration	of	the	chart.		This	indicates	that	Americans	are	turning	more	and	more	to	the	foreign	automotive	manufacturers.	
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Figure	2.8:		Market	Share	in	the	US	of	the	Big	Three	between	1961-2014.		Graph	from	the	Center	for	Automotive	
Research	
 
The	Manufacturing	Sector	
In	identifying	the	importance	of	any	and	all	of	the	Big	Three	automakers,	the	impact	on	gross	domestic	product	and	employment	in	the	United	States	are	the	largest	and	most	valuable	identifiers.		In	contrast	to	smaller	industries,	fluctuations	in	automobiles	are	visibly	reflected	in	these	measurements.	The	automotive	industry	is	contained	in	the	manufacturing	sector	of	American	business.		As	well	as	automobiles,	automotive	parts	are	subsets	of	American	manufacturing.		These	subdivisions	contribute	largely	to	the	manufacturing	industry	and	thus	to	US	GDP	and	employment.			According	to	the	World	Bank,	in	2000,	the	United	States’	manufacturing	sector	contributed	16	percent	of	the	value	added	to	the	national	GDP.		The	Bureau	of	Economic	
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Analysis	has	since	stated	that	in	2008	the	manufacturing	industry	decreased	to	11.3	percent	of	the	United	States’	GDP.		As	seen	in	figure	2.9	below,	manufacturing	still	contributed	the	third	largest	valued	of	national	GDP	after	dropping	over	four	percent	in	eight	years.		The	National	Association	of	Manufacturers	states	that	the	manufacturing	industry	contains	the	“highest	multiplier	effect	of	any	economic	sector”	with	a	1.37	ratio	according	to	data	from	the	BEA.		That	is,	that	every	one-dollar	spent	of	manufacturing	adds	one	dollar	and	thirty-seven	cents	to	the	US	economy	(Top	20	Facts	about).				
 
Figure 2.9:  Percent Contribution to US GDP by industry in 2008:  Data from Center for Automotive Research 	In	2008,	the	automotive	industry	accounted	for	19	percent	of	the	manufacturing	sector’s	output.		That	is	equivalent	to	2.2	percent	of	the	national	GDP	that	year.		As	seen	in	
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Figure	2.10,	this	2008	number	is	relatively	low	for	the	industry.		Around	1999,	the	auto	industry	was	creating	four	percent	of	the	nation’s	GDP.		This	was	over	23	percent	of	the	manufacturing	sector’s	output.		This	is	a	massive	contribution	in	a	sector	as	large	as	the	manufacturing.		While	the	Big	Three	have	declined	significantly	these	numbers	show	the	importance	of	the	industry	to	the	economy.		However,	this	is	only	half	of	the	story	as	employment	is	just	as	crucial	in	the	US	economy	as	the	level	of	GDP.		
 
Figure 2.10:  Automotive output as percentage of GDP.  Data from Center for Automotive Research using data from the 
BEA 
	
Automotive	Employment	
The	importance	of	US	automotive	manufacturing	is	clear	for	the	impact	on	national	GDP.		However,	besides	this,	a	large	reason	for	the	government	bailout	was	to	protect	
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American	jobs.		The	automobile	industry	is	so	vast	that	a	bankruptcy	would	ripple	through	millions	of	individuals	and	their	incomes.		The	United	States	employment	rate	is	a	crucial	statistic	in	measuring	the	health	of	an	economy.		“An	economy	is	reinforced	by	the	size	and	job	creating	capability	of	its	manufacturing	base”	(Center	for	Automotive	Research	2010).		In	addition,	the	automotive	industry	maintains	one	of	the	highest	employee	value-added	rates	among	industry	manufacturers.		In	2006,	each	employee	working	in	motor	vehicles	added	$321,000	of	final	product	into	the	market	according	to	the	Center	for	Automotive	Research.		
 
	
Figure	2.11:		Automotive	Employment	from	1990-2014	by	sector,	measured	in	thousands.		Data	from	the	BLS 
 The	manufacturing	sector	of	the	car	industry	alone	employs	a	very	large	number	of	Americans	who	are	affected	by	the	Big	Three	automakers’	performance.		Figure	2.11	uses	
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data	from	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	to	illustrate	the	number	of	jobs	that	are	affected	by	the	auto	industry.		The	manufacturing	sector,	that	produces	the	parts	and	vehicles	on	the	road,	accounts	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	jobs.		Between	1990	and	2006,	the	automotive	manufacturing	sector	employed	over	one	million	employees	within	the	United	States.		This	figure	peaked	in	2000	with	over	1.3	million	employees	after	continued	success	with	big	vehicles	and	lower	gas	prices.		As	the	Big	Three	started	declining	after	2000,	there	is	a	dramatic	descent	in	manufacturing	employment	that	dropped	even	more	severely	after	2006.		These	are	the	jobs	that	are	being	lost	as	US	car	companies	were	failing	to	sell	as	many	cars.			During	the	recession	when	bankruptcy	was	possible,	the	graph	shows	major	job	cuts	as	the	companies	attempted	to	cut	costs.		Over	one	hundred	thousand	jobs	were	lost	in	auto	manufacturing	between	2007	and	2008	and	again	between	2008	and	2009.		The	year	2009	marked	the	lowest	employment	in	this	sector	in	recent	history.		This	parallels	the	industry’s	performance	and	shows	how	jobs	are	affected	by	the	welfare	of	these	large	companies.		To	think	if	one,	two	or	possibly	all	three	of	the	Big	Three	had	failed,	US	auto	employment	numbers	would	have	continued	to	decline	to	devastating	figures.			Manufacturing	is	not	the	only	employment	sector	of	the	automotive	industry.		As	a	tremendous	industry,	individuals	and	jobs	are	affected	far	beyond	the	factories	that	make	the	cars.		The	dealers	that	sell	vehicles	and	parts	are	also	affected	by	Big	Three.		Looking	again	at	Figure	2.11,	the	numbers	of	dealer	jobs	are	greater	than	manufacturing	positions.		The	trend	in	employment	between	car	dealers	and	parts	dealers	is	nearly	the	same	yet	they	both	differ	from	the	manufacturing	trend.		These	sectors	did	not	see	significant	decline	in	employment	until	2008,	when	the	bailout	began.		This	industry,	too,	would	be	devastated	
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by	the	collapse	of	even	one	of	the	American	automakers.		These	numbers	not	only	show	the	extent	that	the	automakers	affect	the	American	economy	but	also	represent	the	condition	of	the	firms	during	the	time	period.		
	
Figure	2.12:		Total	automotive	employment/Total	US	employment	from	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics 
 When	summing	the	American	automotive	employment	figures,	the	total	is	a	very	significant	percentage	of	the	total	US	employment.		Figure	2.12	shows	the	American	auto	employment	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	nation	employment	each	year	according	to	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics.		Of	all	Americans	employed,	the	auto	industry	accounts	for	around	three	percent	of	jobs.		This	is	a	huge	number	that	represents	the	impact	the	industry	has	on	the	nation.		Looking	at	the	graph,	the	percent	of	US	employment	declines	beginning	in	the	early	2000s.		We	saw	above	how	the	declining	automotive	employment	figures	were	due	to	declining	performance.		However,	figure	2.12	shows	that,	during	the	
2	2.2	
2.4	2.6	
2.8	3	
3.2	3.4	
Total	US	Auto	Employment	as	Percentage	of	
Total	US	Employment	
	 48	
recessionary	period,	the	auto	industry	is	declining	more	significantly	than	the	entire	economy	in	terms	of	employment.		If	the	decline	in	employment	was	due	to	the	recession	alone,	the	graph	would	show	a	more	flat	distribution.		This	is	because	the	auto	employment	would	be	reducing	evenly	relative	to	total	employment.		Since	there	is	a	major	decline	from	2006	to	2009,	the	Big	Three	are	performing	worse	than	the	overall	nation.	While	many	foreign	car	manufacturers	are	now	producing	vehicles	within	the	United	States,	Figure	2.13	displays	their	employment	gap	from	the	Big	Three.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	are	employing	almost	a	68	percent	majority	of	American	automotive	jobs.		This	means	that	the	majority	of	the	auto	jobs	are	held	by	those	affected	by	the	three	American	companies.		According	the	American	Automotive	Policy	Council,	in	2014	Fiat	Chrysler	Automobiles	employs	16.84	percent	of	the	American	Automotive	jobs.		If	the	smallest	American	auto	company	had	not	been	bailed	out	and	had	failed	during	the	recession,	this	portion	of	workers	would	have	been	unemployed.		This	is	a	huge	number	that	would	have	brought	national	unemployment	numbers	down	significantly.	
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Figure 2.13:  Employment in the United States from the automotive industry by manufacturer.  Data from American 
Automotive Policy Council 
 
  As	it	is	proven	above,	the	economic	climate	was	clearly	not	the	sole	reason	behind	the	decline	of	the	American	auto	companies.		The	statement	in	the	previous	section	from	Chrysler	CEO,	Robert	Nardelli,	stating	the	company	performance	was	entirely	due	to	the	financial	crisis	is	evidently	false.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	were	declining	at	a	different	rate	that	the	US	economy	due	to	a	lack	of	innovation	and	progression.		The	big	business	strategies	used	by	the	three	firms	put	them	behind	the	foreign	companies	out	of	Japan	and	Germany.		As	we	will	examine	in	the	following	chapter,	the	financialization	and	practices	of	the	American	auto	companies	also	contributed	to	their	downfall	and	subsequent	crash.		 
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3.		Financialization	of	the	Automobile	
	 The	half-century	before	the	Great	Depression	was	consumed	with	big	business	and	the	rise	of	robber	barons.		American	business	grew	and	industrialized	through	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	becoming	known	as	the	“industrial	period”.		As	businesses	grew,	each	required	more	and	more	funding	to	handle	costs	and	business	expenses.		It	quickly	became	impossible	to	fund	these	large	companies	through	individual	wealth.		Therefore,	the	necessity	to	borrow	became	abundant	to	support	and	continue	to	grow	big	firms.		This	began	the	financial	economic	stage	in	the	United	States.		Financial	institutions	sold	equity	shares	directly	to	the	firms	influenced	by	“whirlwinds	of	optimism	and	pessimism”	(Wray	2011c	4).		These	financial	institutions	would	then	create	trusts	and	inflate	them	with	gullible	public	investment.		They	would	then	sell	off	their	shares	and	abandon	the	fund.		This	process	created	little	real	production	and	was	based	on	the	speculation	of	trading	capital.		“There	were	no	‘fundamentals’	to	drive	the	Wall	Street	boom.		Inevitably,	it	collapsed	and	a	‘debt	deflation’	began	as	everyone	tried	to	sell	out	of	their	positions	in	stocks—causing	prices	to	collapse”	(Wray	2011c	4).		It	took	the	real	spending	of	World	War	II	to	get	out	of	the	Great	Depression.		The	period	that	followed	the	Second	World	War	was	the	welfare	state	in	which	the	economy	maintained	stability.		This	was	continued	through	the	majority	of	the	twentieth	century	until	new	financial	practices	beginning	in	the	1980s	brought	about	a	new	economic	state.				
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Financial	Fragility	
	 Minsky	breaks	modern	financial	lending	into	three	risk	categories:	hedge,	speculative	and	Ponzi	finance.		In	order,	this	refers	to	the	level	of	fragility	from	the	safest	to	the	most	risky.		In	hedge	finance,	an	individual	or	institution	holds	enough	liquid	cash	to	payoff	the	entirety	of	the	obligation,	including	interest,	at	any	time.		This	means	the	borrower	is	able	to	“fulfill	contractual	payment	commitments	on	liabilities”	(Minsky	1992b	4).		Speculative	finance	signifies	that	the	incoming	cash	flows	are	enough	to	pay	off	interest	but	not	the	full	value	of	the	commitment.		Lastly,	a	Ponzi	posture	means	the	individual	or	institution	lack	the	ability	to	pay	either	interest	or	the	principle	value.		In	Ponzi	finance,	the	borrower	must	borrow	further	in	order	to	repay	the	initial	commitment,	placing	themselves	in	more	debt.		“Note	that	Ponzi	financing	decreases	equity	for	debt	increases	without	any	increase	in	assets”	(Minsky	1992b	6).		If	the	institution	does	not	borrow	more	money	to	cover	the	interest	payments	required,	they	will	default	on	the	obligation.		 These	different	financial	strategies	determine	the	fragility	of	an	institution.		Each	economy	holds	a	mixture	of	hedge,	speculative	and	Ponzi	postures.		If	there	is	a	majority	of	hedge	finance,	the	institution	is	likely	to	be	less	fragile	than	one	that	is	saturated	with	Ponzi	positions.		Banks	use	speculative	finance,	as	they	are	able	to	replay	interest	to	investors	but	do	not	hold	enough	liquid	cash	to	repay	the	full	amount.		This	system	stays	relatively	stable	as	banks	could	maintain	paying	interest	to	their	investors	as	long	as	they	did	not	withdraw	their	initial	sum.		However,	if	banks	were	to	use	Ponzi	finance,	the	system	would	be	extremely	risky	and	unstable	and	inevitably	lead	to	a	crash.		“A	liability	structure	in	which	units	are	heavily	in	debt	so	that	speculative	and	even	Ponzi	finance	are	common	will	be	
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towards	the	fragility	end	of	spectrum”	(Minsky	1992b	5).		Each	financialized	institution	balances	on	some	combination	of	the	three	postures.			Financial	fragility	is	the	weakness	behind	a	capitalist	economy.		Unlike	an	industrial	based	economy,	financialization	balances	on	speculative	monetary	exchanges.		The	problem	with	this	is	that	financial	business	uses	few	real	foundations	as	supports.		According	to	Minsky,	“a	collapse	of	asset	values,	which	forces	the	price	of	capital	assets	below	the	cost	of	production	of	investment	output,	could	occur	in	many	countries”	(Minsky	1992b	2).		Minsky	sees	this	as	the	risks	in	a	financial	economy	and	he	believes	this	collapse	would	undoubtedly	lead	to	a	global	depression.			The	early	1990s	saw	the	development	of	securitization	of	financial	institutions.		One	purpose	of	this	was	to	move	assets	off	balance	sheets.		Doing	so	would	reduce	capital	requirements.		“If	assets	did	not	need	to	be	counted,	leverage	ratios	could	rise	tremendously”	(Wray	2011a	5).		The	institution	is	also	able	to	choose	its	risk	and	return	using	securities.		This	securitization	system	grew	tremendously,	as	Minsky	said,	“that	which	can	be	securitized	will	be	securitized”	(Minsky	1987).		Using	securities,	businesses	avoid	the	traditional	banking	system.	Minsky	uses	the	phrase,	“make	position	by	selling	out	position”	(Minsky	1992c),	in	order	to	describe	the	strategy	among	financial	institutions.		This	terminology	refers	to	the	position	of	banks	and	other	institutions	that	use	financial	lending	and	borrowing.		Selling	position	refers	to	selling	debt	in	order	to	have	more	capital	to	invest.		Banks	and	firms	then	lend	this	borrowed	money	to	individuals	in	the	form	of	loans.		The	institutions	will	then	profit	from	the	loans’	interest	to	pay	back	their	debt.		This	type	of	business	can	range	from	
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stable	to	fragile	based	on	the	above	borrowing	practices	that	are	used.		As	we	will	see	below,	capitalist	tendencies	move	lending	and	borrowing	into	a	riskier	state.	Keynes’	financial	instability	interpretation,	or	the	financial	instability	hypothesis,	believes	that	after	a	duration	of	economically	strong	time,	a	financial	institution	will	progress	toward	fragility.		The	theory	believes	that	as	a	capitalist	institution	develops,	it	will	become	progressively	financialized.		This	means	it	would	rely	more	and	more	on	borrowed	money	and	therefore	moving	further	from	hedge	and	closer	toward	Ponzi	finance.		This	dependency	is	based	on	the	exchange	of	present	money	for	future	money.		“The	present	money	pays	for	resources	that	go	into	the	production	of	investment	output,	whereas	the	future	money	is	the	‘profits’	which	will	accrue	to	the	capital	asset	owning	firms”	(Minsky	1992c	2).		Firms	understand	that	it	will	be	more	profitable	to	borrow	more	money	and	therefore	hold	less	liquid	capital.			During	the	1990s	and	2000s,	banks	and	financial	institutions	were	undergoing	this	transition.		It	was	more	profitable	to	borrow	more	money	in	order	to	loan	out	further	capital.		This	meant	moving	closer	and	closer	toward	Ponzi	finance.		In	addition,	banks	were	borrowing	money	short	term	rather	than	long	term.		“If	the	Fed	was	willing	to	raise	rates	that	much,	no	financial	institution	could	afford	to	be	stuck	with	long-term	fixed-rate	mortgages”	(Wray	2011a	5).		Short-term	borrowing	allowed	them	to	have	fewer	costs	associated	with	each	sum	of	borrowed	money.		The	problem	with	this	system	is	it	relies	on	the	loans	and	interest	coming	into	the	bank	to	pay	back	the	debt.		If	the	institution	does	not	have	these	cash	flows	it	cannot	repay	its	debts.		As	we	will	see	below,	this	became	a	major	problem	leading	up	to	the	financial	crisis.	
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Minsky	understood	the	capitalist	banking	cycle	and	believes	it	is	a	natural	progressive	change.		His	theory	is	that	capitalism	drives	toward	financialization	and	institutions	will	therefore	try	to	continuously	“make	position	by	selling	out	position”.		As	this	occurs	further	and	further,	the	economic	structure	will	become	more	fragile.		The	riskier	financial	policies	will	create	wholes	that	could	collapse	the	system.		This	means	a	collapse	and	a	resurrection	are	destined	within	this	system.		Minsky	stated	that	government	intervention	is	natural	part	of	the	process	and	should	not	be	viewed	as	a	“bailout”.		He	stated:	The	need	for	the	government	to	intervene	to	refinance	savings	and	loan	associations	and	commercial	banks	should	be	viewed	as	a	normal	and	therefor	expected	result	of	the	characteristics	of	the	economy	which	make	intermittent	bouts	of	chaos,	incoherence	or	hysteresis	occur	and	where	the	consequences	of	allowing	free	reign	to	such	“states	of	nature’	are	deemed	unacceptable	(Minsky	1992b	13).		This	means	Minsky	understood	the	build	up	to	and	the	reasons	behind	financial	crises.		He	believed	it	was	expected	for	the	financial	institutions	to	become	increasingly	fragile	leading	to	a	crash.		 	
Money	Manager	Capitalism	
According	to	Wray,	the	2007	financial	crisis	was	the	result	of	several	key	financial	components.		These	components	changed	the	dynamic	of	the	financial	and	business	markets.		The	first	was	the	rise	of	professional	money	managers	who	seek	maximum	returns	from	the	funds	they	control.		This	is	known	as	managed	money.		The	problem	with	this	is	each	manager	has	the	goal	of	total	return	and	is	competing	for	clients.		This	influences	the	managers	to	make	riskier	investments	and	to	exaggerate	their	numbers.		The	money	managers	along	with	shadow	banks,	or	“financial	institutions	that	are	not	regulated	
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as	banks”	(Wray	2011c	6),	would	purchase	commercial	paper	or	junk	bonds	from	firms,	usually	in	the	form	of	securities.		Along	with	this,	an	increase	in	outsourcing	in	which	money	managers	such	as	hedge	funds	would	hire	Wall	Street	firms	to	manage	money.		This	would	lead	to	abusive	practices	like	“shoveling	trashy	assets	like	asset	backed	securities	(ABS)	and	collateralized	debt	obligations	(CDOs)	onto	portfolios	of	clients”	(Wray	2011c	7).		These	investment	banks	would	also	help	their	clients	disguise	or	hide	debt.		 This	system	that	began	in	the	1990s	was	the	beginning	of	money	manager	capitalism.		Minsky	coined	this	term,	calling	it	“the	modern	form	of	the	previous	stage	of	finance	capitalism	that	self-	destructed	in	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s”	(Wray	2011a	2).		He	saw	this	system	as	a	culmination	of	the	issues	Wray	stated	above	and	added	that	there	was	little	regulation	or	supervision.		As	the	name	suggests,	this	period	was	saturated	with	money	managers	creating	growing	risk	while	competing	for	clients	and	returns.		This	type	of	business	quickly	drew	upon	riskier	financing	using	speculative	and	Ponzi	positions.		Figure	3.1	illustrates	the	rise	of	managed	money	and	the	decline	of	banking.		Managed	money	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to,	hedge	funds,	pension	funds,	sovereign	wealth	funds,	mutual	funds	and	university	endowments.	
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Figure	3.1:		Graph	from	Minsky	2011a.		Graph	from	Federal	Reserve	Flow	of	Funds	Accounts	
	 	
Automotive	Financialization	
Since	the	beginning	of	the	automotive	industry,	the	carmakers	have	maintained	high	operating	leverage.		According	to	the	Foundations	of	Financial	Management,	“operating	leverage	reflects	the	extent	to	which	fixed	assets	and	associated	fixed	costs	are	utilized	in	the	business”	(Block,	Hirt,	and	Danielsen	126).		The	operating	leverage	of	a	firm	is	based	on	the	company’s	total	costs	and	total	revenue.		As	illustrated	in	figure	3.2,	a	firm	with	high	fixed	costs	and	low	variable	costs	will	have	a	more	flat	costs	curve	while	a	company	with	low	fixed	costs	and	high	variable	costs	will	have	a	steep	cost	curve.		As	the	cost	is	flatter,	there	is	greater	area	between	that	and	the	total	revenue	curve	as	displayed	below	on	the	left.		This	means	under	the	break-even	(BE)	point	a	firm	endures	substantial	losses	while	above	the	break	even	will	provide	large	profits.		A	firm	with	lower	fixed	costs,	and	
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therefore	less	operating	leverage,	will	have	a	higher	break-even	point	but	will	undergo	more	mild	losses	up	to	that	point.	As	automakers,	there	are	many	large	fixed	costs	that	are	associated	with	the	industry.		The	costs	of	multiple	plants	along	with	a	great	amount	of	machinery	are	all	fixed,	as	they	do	not	fluctuate.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	therefore	all	endured	high	operating	leverage	from	their	numerous	assets.		This	meant	their	total	costs	and	total	revenues	resembled	the	left	figure	below	more	than	the	right.		For	the	auto	companies,	if	they	were	able	to	sell	vehicles	and	have	revenues	above	the	break-even	point,	their	profits	were	high	and	would	continue	to	grow	substantially	the	higher	their	revenue.		However,	if	the	manufacturers	could	not	reach	this	crucial	point,	they	experienced	huge	losses.		During	the	1990s	when	the	Big	Three	were	able	to	sell	big	numbers	of	SUVs,	their	profits	were	large.		However,	as	we	examined	in	previous	chapters,	SUV	sales	sunk	in	the	2000s	with	rising	oil	prices	and	their	profits	disappeared.		This	meant	that	the	high	operating	leverage	and	high	fixed	costs	cost	the	companies	huge	amounts	of	money.		
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Figure	3.2:		Total	Revenue	vs.	Total	Costs	displaying	operating	leverage	of	2	separate	firms		 Leading	up	to	2007,	the	American	automobile	companies	also	began	following	the	trend	of	financialization.		The	car	companies	began	making	more	and	more	loans	to	individuals	purchasing	vehicles.		Additionally,	there	was	an	increase	in	leased	vehicles	from	all	three	manufacturers.		The	manufacturers	were	profiting	more	from	the	loans	and	leases	on	vehicles	than	from	the	sale	of	the	car	or	truck.		This	encouraged	financial	lending	and	discouraged	industrialization.		Meaning,	the	car	companies	had	less	incentive	to	create	new	technologies	and	improvements	in	their	vehicles.		This	explains	largely	to	the	auto	companies’	lack	of	innovation	displayed	in	the	previous	chapter.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	were	not	as	concerned	with	the	quality	of	the	vehicles	being	produced	as	much	as	the	financing	of	the	good.	Between	1990	and	the	auto	bailout	in	2009,	the	Big	Three	showed	a	similar	path	of	developments	that	professor	Wray	believed	lead	the	economy	as	a	whole	to	the	financial	crisis.		Following	the	characteristics	of	money	manager	capitalism,	the	American	automakers	wanted	to	move	assets	off	their	balance	sheets	in	order	to	reduce	capital	
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requirements.		Money	managers	controlled	each	company’s	money	and	acted	in	the	interest	of	only	achieving	high	total	return.		Before	money	managers,	the	company	would	put	capital	towards	the	best	long-term	interest	of	the	firm.		Money	managers	were	not	interested	in	items	such	as	upgrading	equipment	and	numerical	costs.		Money	managers	encouraged	whatever	practices	lead	to	the	greatest	profitability.		This	created	a	very	short-term	view	as	the	managers	wanted	to	generate	the	highest	profits.	In	addition	to	money	managers,	the	automotive	companies	themselves	became	banking	institutions.		As	Wray	described	above,	the	three	were	acting	as	shadow	banks.		Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	were	giant	companies	with	huge	amounts	of	capital.		They	saw	the	profitability	of	loaning	money	and	did	not	have	reason	to	use	a	third	party	for	what	they	could	do	themselves.		This	describes	the	system	of	big	business	the	American	car	companies	were	using	in	manufacturing	as	they	were	vertically	integrated	to	produce	many	parts	themselves.		The	auto	companies	transformed	their	treasury	departments	into	profit	centers.		In	creating	and	using	their	financing	arms	such	as	GMAC	and	Chrysler	Capital	the	carmakers	were	able	to	disguise	assets	using	shadow	banking	strategies.		This	was	accompanied	by	the	outsourcing	of	auto	loans	to	investment	banks.		The	different	banks	would	compete	to	purchase	the	loans	from	the	auto	manufacturers	creating	layering.		This	means	there	are	intermediaries	who	increase	the	firm’s	financial	leverage.	The	auto	companies	were	increasing	their	financial	leverage	through	these	developing	practices.		“Financial	leverage	is	the	degree	to	which	a	company	uses	fixed-income	securities	such	as	debt	and	preferred	equity”	(Financial	Leverage	and	Capital).		According	to	Investopedia,	as	a	firm	uses	more	debt	financing	the	higher	its	financial	leverage	will	be.		The	DuPont	system	of	analysis	states	that	financial	leverage,	also	known	
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as	the	equity	multiplier,	is	directly	related	to	return	on	equity,	profit	margin	and	asset	turnover.		The	DuPont	return	on	equity	(ROE)	equation	is	as	follows:		!"#$%& !" !"#$%& = !"# !"#$%& !"#$%& ∗ !""#$ !"#$%&'# ∗ !"#$%& !"#$%&#%'(			The	profit	margin	of	the	firms	represents	operating	efficiency	while	the	asset	turnover	shows	the	asset	efficiency,	or	how	well	assets	were	used	to	generate	sales.		The	equation	illustrates	that	if	profit	margin,	asset	turnover	and/or	equity	increase	the	return	on	equity	will	also	increase.		However	a	combination	of	fluctuations	in	these	three	variables	will	create	a	relative	change.				 Every	firm	aims	to	increase	its	return	on	equity.		The	ROE	tells	investors	whether	a	company	will	provide	them	with	strong	returns	on	their	capital.		“Ideally,	investors	and	analysts	prefer	to	see	higher	returns	on	equity”	(Maverick).		If	companies	are	handled	by	money	managers,	they	are	required	to	have	a	high	return	or	the	money	managers	will	not	do	business	with	them.		They	can	achieve	this	if	their	profit	margin,	asset	turnover	and/or	equity	multiplier	are	strong.		The	US	auto	companies	understood	this	and	aimed	towards	a	high	return	on	equity	to	satisfy	the	managers.			 Illustrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	American	car	companies	were	far	behind	the	innovation	of	the	foreign	firms.		This	meant	that	they	were	not	able	to	compete	over	cost	as	the	Japanese	and	Germans	optimized	efficiency.		The	American	response	to	this	was	to	compete	over	quantity	by	producing	as	many	vehicles	as	possible.		This	strategy	did	not	work	until	1990	when	the	American	firms	began	producing	SUVs.		This	was	a	product	the	foreign	companies	did	not	have,	and	therefore	the	Americans	did	not	have	this	outside	competition.		The	Big	Three	repackaged	their	trucks	that	they	had	been	manufacturing	for	
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decades	into	the	SUV,	which	they	could	then	sell	at	a	high	price.		This	meant	that	the	American	profit	margins	were	much	higher	on	SUVs	than	their	sedans	and	small	cars.		The	money	managers	saw	this	and	encouraged	SUV	production.		This	behavior	leads	to	higher	asset	turnover,	as	the	car	companies	were	able	to	sell	many	more	vehicles	at	a	quicker	rate.		This	production	trend	increased	the	American	auto	profit	margins	and	asset	turnovers,	which	caused	an	inflated	return	on	equity.		 The	third	element	to	affect	the	American	auto	companies’	ROE	was	the	equity	multiplier	of	the	firm.		This	means	collecting	more	debt	by	borrowing	more	money.		As	we	saw	above,	the	Americans	already	had	high	operating	leverage	and	needed	to	pair	this	with	an	increased	financial	leverage.		Not	only	would	increased	financial	leverage	provide	the	companies	with	benefits	such	as	concealing	assets	and	increased	profits,	but	this	would	also	create	a	higher	return	on	capital	for	money	managers	and	investors.		This	incentivized	the	carmakers	to	accumulate	further	short-term	debt.		While	the	ROE	can	be	a	good	measure	of	investment	profitability,	this	shows	that	a	high	return	can	also	be	a	sign	of	risky	financing	and	therefore	risky	investment.			In	evaluating	a	firm,	the	debt-to-equity	ratio	(D/E)	is	equally	as	important	as	the	return	on	equity.		This	ratio	is	an	appropriate	measure	because	the	manufacturing	of	automobiles	is	a	very	capital-intensive	industry.		“An	increasing	D/E	ratio	indicates	a	company	is	being	increasingly	financed	by	creditors	rather	than	by	its	own	equity”	(Maverick).		While	holding	some	debt	is	healthy	for	a	company,	containing	too	much	is	a	sign	of	risky	financial	practices.		This	means	move	further	from	hedge	and	closer	to	Ponzi	finance.		“Both	investors	and	potential	lenders	prefer	to	see	a	lower	D/E	ratio.	In	general,	an	ideal	D/E	ratio	is	around	1	when	liabilities	are	roughly	equal	to	equity”	(Maverick).		
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Debt-to-equity	ratios	can	either	take	the	form	of	a	numerical	figure	or	as	a	percentage	(!"#$%! ∗ 100%).		If	a	firm’s	debt-to-equity	ratio	is	greater	than	1	(100%)	the	firm	has	more	debt	than	equity	and	may	be	a	risky	investment.		 As	the	American	auto	companies	continued	to	borrow	more	and	participate	in	risky	lending	beginning	around	1990,	their	debt-to-equity	ratio	was	representative	of	their	financial	practices.		Looking	at	figure	3.3	below,	the	debt-to-equity	ratios	of	Ford	is	well	above	that	of	the	foreign	firms.		Capital-intensive	industry	such	as	automobile	manufacturing	typically	has	higher	D/E	ratios	than	other	industries.		The	D/E	ratio	of	Japanese	and	German	automakers	is	much	below	that	of	Ford,	showing	that	the	US	firm	had	a	different	business	model	than	foreigners.		Honda,	Toyota	and	Volkswagen	all	have	debt-to-equity	ratios	around	1,	paralleling	Maverick’s	statement	above	about	a	healthy	ratio.		However,	Ford	currently	has	a	D/E	ratio	three	to	four	time	that	of	these	foreign	automakers.		Ford	also	has	enormous	jumps	between	2006-2012	due	to	the	large	amount	of	capital	it	borrowed	in	2006	and	the	overall	financial	crisis	over	the	period.		
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Figure	3.3:	Debt-to-Equity	ratios	of	American	and	foreign	automakers.		Graph	powered	by	YCHARTS		 	Figure	3.4	illustrates	the	D/E	ratios	of	the	other	two	US	automakers	from	the	mid	1990s	to	20152.		This	graph	uses	data	from	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	annual	reports.		Both	companies	were	restructured	after	the	bailout	and	Chrysler	changed	ownership	from	Daimler	to	Fiat.		This	is	represented	through	the	fluctuations	and	jumps	in	the	data.3		While	the	numbers	are	on	average	below	that	of	Ford	above,	both	companies	are	still	substantially	higher	than	the	Japanese	and	Germans.		The	annual	reports	presented	by	GM	and	Chrysler	are	illusive	and	display	characteristics	of	firms	hiding	debt	and	assets	as	discussed	earlier.		General	Motors	generally	reported	very	low	levels	of	debt	while	disguising	the	majority	under	GMAC.		Similar	is	true	for	Chrysler	and	Chrysler	Capital.		Both																																																									2	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	are	separated	from	figure	3.3	because	of	limited	information	due	to	the	company	restructuring	after	the	2009	bailout.	3	General	Motors	2002	value	affected	by	high	pension	liabilities	and	therefore	assessed	using	varied	formula	
	 64	
of	these	financing	arms	are	shadow	banks	for	the	manufacturers.		The	higher	levels	of	debt	that	the	Americans	have	over	the	foreign	brands	shows	they	are	financing	more	based	on	borrowed	money.		
Figure	3.4:		Debt-to-Equity	Ratios	for	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	from	1995-2015		 Figure	3.5	below	displays	the	asset-backed	securities	issued	by	auto	manufacturers	between	2000-2015.		“An	asset-backed	security	(ABS)	is	a	financial	security	backed	by	a	loan,	lease	or	receivables	against	assets	other	than	real	estate	and	mortgage-backed	securities”	(Asset-Backed	Securities	–	ABS).		These	numbers	represent	the	number	of	loans	and	leases	being	issued	by	automotive	companies.		The	automakers	would	then	sell	these	loans	to	banks	in	the	form	of	securities.		This	is	the	process	of	outsourcing	as	discussed	previously.		The	steep	rise	in	ABSs	between	2000	and	2005	is	reflective	of	the	easy	credit,	
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high	housing	prices	and	strong	economic	climate.		This	created	increased	demand	for	new	vehicles	and	the	carmakers	were	happy	to	issue	more	loans.		However,	the	economy	weakened	after	this	point	leaving	consumers	with	depreciated	vehicles	they	could	not	pay	off.		“A	serious	recession	might	cause	many	car	owners	to	default	on	their	car	payments	to	GMAC,	and	thus	leave	the	owners	of	the	asset-backed	security	without	the	promised	cash	flows.		This	happened	quite	often	in	2007-2009”	(Block,	Hirt,	and	Danielsen	242).		If	financial	institutions	were	borrowing	short-term,	which	the	American	auto	companies	were	doing,	they	would	then	lack	the	cash	flows	to	repay	their	obligations.		This	is	how	the	automakers	began	dealing	in	Ponzi	finance	as	they	relied	on	cash	flows	to	repay	interest	as	well	as	the	value	of	their	obligation.		Lacking	the	income,	the	system	failed	to	be	maintained	and	collapsed	inward	on	the	Big	Three.			
	
Figure	3.5:		Automotive	ABS	issuances	from	2000-2015	
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	After	2005	there	is	a	substantial	fall	in	figure	3.5,	indicating	a	decreasing	number	of	ABSs.		This	was	due	to	falling	demand	along	with	the	inability	of	the	automakers	to	get	the	financing	to	make	loans.		The	fall	is	also	prevalent	in	figure	3.6	that	shows	the	change	in	issuances.		There	is	a	steady	decline	in	the	number	from	2006	to	2010.		After	years	of	firms	issuing	fewer	and	fewer	loans,	the	Fed	began	the	Term	Asset-Backed	Securities	Loan	Facility	(TALF)	program	to	help	the	flow	of	credit.	(Felkerson).		This	allowed	automakers	and	other	financial	institutions	to	increase	the	issuance	of	loans,	and	therefore	asset-backed	securities.		This	is	illustrated	in	both	figures	as	the	program	succeeded	in	increasing	the	number	of	asset-backed	securities.		If	this	program	had	not	been	put	in	place,	it	is	certain	ABSs	would	have	continued	to	decline.		When	the	TALF	program	ends	around	2012,	the	ABS	issuances	slow	down.	
	
Figure	3.6:		Percent	change	in	auto	ABS	issuances	from	previous	year	
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	These	figures	are	clear	indicators	that	the	American	automakers	had	spread	into	a	wider	industry.		The	money	manager	control	diverged	the	US	firms	further	from	manufacturing	and	closer	to	the	banking	sector.		Acting	to	achieve	high	profits,	the	Big	Three	became	consumed	with	issuing	loans	and	accumulating	debt.		Their	practices	grew	more	and	more	risky	until	there	was	no	way	to	sustain	the	debt	system.		This	led	to	the	crash	during	the	financial	crisis.		Contrary	to	popular	belief,	the	financial	crisis	was	not	the	cause	of	the	auto	bailout	but	just	a	factor	that	contributed	to	the	final	descent.			 	
	 68	
Conclusion	
	 The	American	automotive	CEOs	argued	that	it	the	fault	of	the	economy	as	a	whole	that	the	Big	Three	had	fallen	to	the	brink	of	failure.		It	is	clear	now	that	this	was	false	and	the	companies	themselves	drove	themselves	into	the	ground.	The	performance	of	the	three	companies	in	relation	to	that	of	the	whole	economy	indicated	the	automakers	were	underperforming	because	of	unique	problems.		Years	of	short-term	views	and	big	business	strategy	limited	Ford,	General	Motors	and	Chrysler	from	the	big	picture	of	the	automotive	industry.		However,	it	was	not	exclusively	the	traditional	issues	of	industrialization	that	drove	the	decline	but	a	new	stage	of	capitalist	financialization.		 Focusing	short-term,	the	US	automakers	overly	compensated	their	business	techniques	with	large	vehicles	and	SUVs.		They	were	not	able	to	compete	with	the	efficiency	of	Japanese	or	German	firms	in	producing	small	cars	but	saw	an	opening	in	the	large	car	market.		The	Americans	were	able	to	generate	much	higher	profit	margins	producing	SUVs	and	did	not	have	strong	foreign	competition	in	the	90s.		The	low	oil	prices	allowed	them	to	sell	mass	amounts	of	these	vehicles	and	the	money	managers	encouraged	high	asset	turnovers	to	increase	return	on	equity.		On	top	of	this,	increased	debt	caused	the	firms	to	become	more	risky.		This	increased	the	financial	leverage	of	the	US	automakers	and	incentivized	them	to	increase	their	financial	business	instead	of	their	manufacturing	sector.		Innovation	suffered	because	of	this	and	made	the	Big	Three	fall	further	behind	foreign	competition.		The	US	carmakers	therefore	fell	apart	because	of	the	backward	system	of	taking	financial	priority	above	manufacturing.			
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Financialization	proved	to	be	a	profitable	yet	harmful	characteristic	of	the	American	auto	big	business.		Though	this	lead	up	to	what	Minsky	calls	a	natural	bailout,	the	automakers	do	not	appear	to	be	learning	from	their	mistakes.		In	a	Reuters	article	written	by	Bernie	Woodall,	Ben	Klayman	and	Paul	Lienert	in	August	2014,	the	three	stated	that	risky	automotive	lending	has	increased	since	the	2009	bailout.		Before	the	financial	crisis,	subprime	home	loans	grew	out	of	control	from	a	lack	of	regulation	and	oversight.		Now,	the	regulatory	agencies	have	a	firm	hold	on	home	loans,	so	banks	are	instead	changing	their	sights	on	auto	loans.		There	is	much	less	regulation	on	unsuspecting	auto	loans	and	we	are	seeing	a	rise	in	subprime	loans.		“General	Motors	Co	(GM.N)	is	among	several	automakers	recording	growth	in	subprime	lending,	to	borrowers	with	credit	scores	of	less	than	620”	(Woodall,	Klayman,	Lienert).		The	capitalist	system	of	financing	continues,	as	there	are	profits	to	be	made.		These	subprime	auto	loans	may	soon	bubble	up,	leading	to	the	next	economic	recession	since	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble	in	the	2007.			 	
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